

THE SEIZING OF THE SANTA MARIA

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The fully-documented
inside story—
a Portuguese
cruise ship captured
on the high seas
by a handful of men—
the most incredible
story of 1961



by HENRY A. ZEIGER

**PIRATES SEIZE
PORTUGUESE LINER AT SEA ...**

**STOLEN CRUISE SHIP
REFUSES CALL TO TURN BACK ...**

**SEIZED SHIP SIGHTED;
NAVY DESTROYER GIVES CHASE ...**

. . . Thus the newspapers reported as the world watched breathlessly the astounding spectacle of a giant ocean liner seized by "pirates" in the year of 1961.

Here, reported in depth for the first time, is the full story of what happened on the cruise ship *Santa Maria*, beginning at the moment she was taken over by Capt. Henrique Galvao and his men. Here is a vivid, authentic account—including background information about Capt. Galvao and his rebellion against Premier Salazar never before revealed.

A NOTE ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Henry A. Zeiger is rapidly gaining a reputation for books that break with the headlines. Prior to **THE SEIZING OF THE SANTA MARIA**, he wrote **THE CASE AGAINST ADOLF EICHMANN**, the first book to appear after the capture of the former Nazi prison camp official.

Mr. Zeiger, a graduate of Kenyon College, has also studied at Columbia University and Yale. Now a free-lance writer, he formerly worked for the New York Herald Tribune and a leading man's magazine. He is also a playwright, one of his dramas having appeared in *Best Short Plays of 1955-56*.

**THE
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OF THE
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MARIA**

HENRY A. ZEIGER

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For much of the information relating to the trial of Galvao, the author is indebted to Maria Archer's book: *Os Ultimos Dias do Fascismo Portugues* (The Last Days of Portuguese Fascism).

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Chronology of Principal Events

Saturday, Jan. 21—The *Santa Maria* sails from Willemstad, Curacao, for Port Everglades, Florida. Scheduled arrival, Jan. 24.

Sunday, Jan. 22—Twenty-four Spanish and Portuguese rebels under Henrique Galvao take over the *Santa Maria* at about 1:30 AM. One crew member is killed, two are wounded in the struggle for the ship.

Monday, Jan. 23—Lifeboat lands wounded man and some of crew at St. Lucia. *Santa Maria* sails away at top speed. Chase begins. British frigate, two American destroyers, eight planes join in hunt.

Tuesday, Jan. 24—Galvao informs world that seizure of ship is part of a revolution against Salazar's regime. Danish freighter spots *Santa Maria*.

Wednesday, Jan. 25—*Santa Maria* spotted by Navy patrol plane. Galvao refuses to turn back, radios: "Destination, Angola."

Thursday, Jan. 26—Report from *Santa Maria* that food, water are rationed. Galvao says he is looking for "neutral port" to discharge passengers.

Friday, Jan. 27—Galvao tells Navy he will "accept" Navy's protection against Portuguese warships so he can land passengers.

Saturday, Jan. 28—*Santa Maria* changes course, hovers off Brazilian coast at Recife.

Sunday, Jan. 29—Rear Admiral Smith arrives in Recife to negotiate with Galvao. President Quadros reported willing to grant Galvao political asylum.

Monday, Jan. 30—Admiral Smith and Galvao agree to rendezvous and negotiate.

Tuesday, Jan. 31—Admiral Smith and Galvao meet on board the *Santa Maria*. Galvao willing to land at Recife if he gets "proper guarantees."

Wednesday, Feb. 1—Galvao brings *Santa Maria* just off three-mile limit, confers with Brazilian officials.

Thursday, Feb. 2—*Santa Maria* comes into Recife harbor. Passengers, crew disembark.

Friday, Feb. 3—Galvao surrenders *Santa Maria* to Admiral Dias Fernandes of Brazilian Navy.

Chapter 1

THE FATEFUL MORNING

CHAPTER ONE

THE FATEFUL MORNING

AT approximately 1:30 on the morning of January 23, 1961, the cruise ship *Santa Maria* was cutting lazily through the Caribbean sea on a balmy tropical night. Third pilot Joao Jose do Nascimento Costa, 27 years old and newly a father, the officer in charge of the bridge, turned to light a cigarette when suddenly four armed men, carrying pistols, shotguns and sub-machine guns, thronged onto the bridge. Costa, startled, started to run and was cut down in a hail of gun fire.

The other officer on the bridge, Joao Antonio de Souza, who had been momentarily paralyzed by the sight of the raiders and the gunfire, now started to leave the bridge. He was ordered to halt but kept going. Then he too collapsed in a pool of blood as the newcomers leveled in on him with their rifles.

The crewman at the wheel was hastily shoved aside and replaced by one of the khaki-clad mutineers. Then the leader of the group, a tough, hardened man dressed in yellow with a black beret perched at a cocky angle on his balding head, picked up the phone and dialed Captain

Mario Simoes Maia and said: "This is Captain Galvao who, in the name of General Humberto Delgado, has just taken your ship by assault. You must not try any kind of resistance because it will be violently repressed. Surrender will bring you benefits."

In a few minutes, Captain Maia met with those of his officers he was able to summon, determined they did not have the means to make any further resistance, and surrendered his ship to Henrique Galvao, a man who had been successively army officer, bureaucrat, playwright and propagandist.

Galvao's takeover of the ship had been arranged with lightning speed and precision. In the crew's quarter half a dozen men with sub-machine guns had burst through the doors, routed the sleeping crew out of bed and forced them to lie on the floor with their hands outstretched in front of them. Other men had roamed the officers' quarters and fired bursts of automatic fire at any officer who tried to pop out and see what was happening. The ship's doctor had been slightly wounded in this process.

At other points of the ship, the men on watch were accosted by armed men, driven from their posts and collected in one of the ship's salons. In the engine room a man holding a grenade in one hand and a pistol in the other had seen to it that the engines were kept running.

The passengers, some of whom had been awakened by the gunfire, didn't know what had happened until the following morning. One man who insisted that someone had been shot was told by his wife, "Shut up and go back to bed. And don't drink so much tomorrow night."

Early the next morning Galvao had the passengers assembled, told them that he was now in command of the ship, said that what had happened was all part of a revolt against the Portuguese government headed by Prime Minister Antonio de Oliveira Salazar which was taking place in all Portuguese territory. He informed them that the ship would not put in at Port Everglades (its destination) but that they would be put off at a neutral port. Then he ordered a sailor to play Tchaikovsky's 1812

Overture on the phonograph, and stalked back to the bridge.

Galvao's takeover of the Portuguese liner had been well-planned. Exiled from his native Portugal in 1959, Galvao went first to Argentina then to Venezuela, where he joined forces with other Portuguese and Spanish exiles and formed a Committee for the Liberation of the Iberian Peninsula. After contacting another exile, General Delgado who was then in Sao Paulo, Galvao activated his plans for a general Portuguese revolt against the Salazar regime.

Delgado and Galvao took over a "vacation camp" outside Caracas where members of his junta, many of them still in their teens or early twenties, received training from more experienced revolutionaries from Spain in hand-to-hand fighting.

Galvao also had a woman sympathizer who served as telephone operator aboard the *Santa Maria* and supplied him with a chart of the ship's communication system and the crew's watch stations. Galvao carefully indoctrinated the choice members of his band with this information, then gathered 23 of them and waited for the *Santa Maria* at La Guera, Caracas' seaport.

Before leaving, Galvao offered one Caracas editor the newsbreak of the century. He went to his office, detailed his plans, and invited the editor to send a reporter and a photographer. The editor, too familiar with the pipe-dreams of Latin revolutionaries, laughed him out of his office.

The plan almost fell through when the junta ran out of money before it was able to buy enough tickets for all its rebels. But Galvao, ever-resourceful, was equal to the situation. When the *Santa Maria* docked at La Guera, his men tramped aboard carrying shabby suitcases loaded with weapons. They were accompanied by a large number of male "relatives" who found it comparatively easy to stow away until they emerged from their shelters at the pre-arranged signal.

Galvao, himself, a well-known person in Portugal and considered "extremely dangerous" by the regime, was carried aboard on a stretcher, disguised as an invalid.

The revolt caught the ship's company completely unprepared. Captain Maia, in his account of the incident, stressed how helpless he and his officers were in the face of an armed insurrection: "At approximately 1:30 A.M. on January 23," he said, "a frightened sailor of my ship came running to my cabin to report that some passengers were taking hostile action on the bridge."

The sailor told Captain Maia what had happened on the bridge, that the armed men had apparently wounded the third officer, who was acting as pilot of the ship, and the junior officer who was with him.

The captain originally thought that a passenger of the ship had gone mad, as had been known to happen or that perhaps drinking was to blame. He went up to the bridge then, but when his eyes reached the level of the deck he saw "a man standing in the door across the bridge aiming a machine gun at me."

The captain reacted quickly, retreated down the stairs and ducked into his cabin. He immediately locked the door and turned off the lights, perhaps remembering similar scenes from innumerable movies. Maia then rang the engine room and had the engines cut off. He tried to slip out another door of his cabin, but as he did so he saw one of his officers stretched out on the deck, covered with blood. For a moment Captain Maia thought the man was dead; then he noticed a slight movement. But when he tried to reach out his door to pull the man to safety he nearly walked into a bullet. A short way off he saw one of the rebels aiming a rifle at him. Captain Maia again withdrew to the darkness of his cabin, quickly locking the door.

The Captain could only use his telephone by counting the finger-holes in the dial. He tried to communicate with the crewmen to tell them to arm with whatever they could lay their hands on. But the crew at that moment lay flat on the decks, rebel guns aimed professionally at the backs of their heads. They were in no position to answer the phone.

At the same time, in the officers' quarters, an armed man knocked on one officer's door. The officer opened

the door, and the man let loose a blast from his sub-machine gun, without warning.

The gunman miraculously missed. The officer slammed the door shut and ducked as another hail of bullets ripped through his door. Again the bullets missed their mark.

When the shooting was over, one officer was dead, three were wounded. Of the wounded, one was shot in the back, two had bullets in their lungs.

Back in his cabin Captain Maia picked up someone trying to reach another part of the ship through the telephone system. It was the doctor of the Portuguese Immigration Service, and after Maia had identified himself, the doctor told him that he was wounded and that Henrique Galvao and his followers had taken over the ship. Then Galvao himself called and asked Maia to surrender.

The Captain felt he could only surrender after consulting his officers and the senior members of the crew. When this was set up the Captain realized they were powerless, and in fact Galvao was absolutely right when he said that they had no choice but to surrender. The Captain asked Galvao to meet him in his cabin, and to come unarmed.

Galvao came, but he carried a gun, and was closely followed by four of his followers, also armed.

The Captain could not protest. He had nothing to offer Galvao; Galvao already had it all. The strategic points of the ship were under rebel control and would remain that way. The Captain realized that the safest policy for the passengers and the crew of the *Santa Maria* was surrender.

The next day Captain Galvao allowed Captain Maia to put in at the British possession of St. Lucia to take off the dead officer and several of the wounded. When their story became known they were besieged by reporters. Several gave full statements of what they had seen to the press.

From these statements, the Portuguese government compiled an official version of events aboard the *Santa Maria* which it released in Lisbon.

The official version states that at La Guera and Caracas the *Santa Maria* "received aboard, together with

hundreds of other passengers, about 70 persons who had planned to commit a preposterous crime.

"According to reports received this group was formed by men of several nationalities under the leadership of Captain Henrique Galvao.

"About 2 A.M., January 23, when all passengers were sleeping and only the night watchmen and crew were on duty, the intruders, using weapons they had smuggled on board, assumed the strategic points of the ship and took control of the *Santa Maria*.

"Although unarmed, the crew gallantly resisted, but in vain.

"Reports were received that the third pilot, Joao Jose do Nascimento Costa, was assassinated. Among the many wounded are ship's officer, Jose Antonio Lopes de Souza, and Dr. Cicero Campos Leite.

"Once in possession of the ship the assailants forced the other members of the crew to obey their orders and change course.

"This morning (Monday, January 23) the *Santa Maria* appeared near the island of St. Lucia and sent ashore a number of the wounded about noon.

"The ship then sailed full speed to evade the local maritime authorities."

Several of the excited crew members stated that it was Galvao's intention to scuttle the ship with all hands if he were caught.

Carlo de Carvalho, one of the *Santa Maria's* hospital attendants, spent that first night patching up his fellow crew members. On Sunday, January 22, he had gone to bed about midnight. At 1:30 he was aroused by a distant noise that he thought might have been gunfire. It seemed unlikely, but in a few minutes several crew members came pounding through the corridor. There was a great deal of incomprehensible yelling.

Carvalho halted one of these men and heard what he thought was an incredible story. A band of armed men had shot an officer on the bridge. They were shooting machine guns and pistols, and waving grenades. Only the

sailor's obvious upset kept Carvalho from dismissing it all as a prank or an hallucination.

Carvalho got to his post in the ship's hospital only a few minutes before Third Officer Costa was brought in. He was soaked in his own blood and kept mumbling, "They've killed me, they've killed me." He had been hit three times, in the chest, in the lower abdomen and in his left side. According to Carvalho there was nothing anyone could do for him.

Several seamen carried in Dr. Campos just a short while later. He had been shot in the back. Dr. Campos had first realized that something was going on when he heard a commotion outside his cabin. When he looked out to see what was going on a young rebel fired at him with his machine gun, squeezing off several bursts. The doctor scrambled back into his stateroom. The rebel fired at him again peppering bullets at the closing door. It was a miracle that Campos had been hit only once.

The next victim to be brought to the infirmary was apprentice pilot de Souza. It was he who had been on the bridge when the rebels first took over. He had tried to get away to the Captain's cabin but had been cut down swiftly. He had received three serious gunshot wounds.

Hospitalman de Carvalho had his hands full. "I stayed in the hospital through the night," he told a reporter, "tending to the needs of the wounded and watching Costa grow steadily weaker. Sometime before dawn one of the rebels came in, brandishing a pistol, to see how the wounded were. He left without telling us anything. At 7:20 A.M. Costa died."

At 9 o'clock Monday morning the ship's public address system blared forth a statement by the rebels. The passengers were told not to fear, that the rebels were in total command of the ship, that they regretted the bloodshed. The announcer added that the *Santa Maria's* new destination must be a secret.

There was a worrisome time for the crew members before the stopover at St. Lucia. There was no telling what this band of rebels was planning to do, and the crew

stayed below decks as much as possible. Crewmen were placed under constant surveillance as they performed their chores. Some of the sailors later admitted to doubting they would ever make it back to shore alive. The crew was stunned and frightened to a point where the food on their plates went uneaten.

Then on Monday the hospital orderly de Carvalho was told he had been chosen to go ashore in a lifeboat to look after the wounded de Souza. When he arrived on the boat deck with the injured man he got his first look at the passengers since the rebels had taken over. They had all assembled on the deck, watching in silence. They too were frightened. Some of the women and children were in tears, and their faces revealed the terrifying uncertainty of their circumstances.

The crewmen were put over the side and got underway for the island of St. Lucia, just a few miles away. As they moved away from the ship Captain Maia stood proudly at the bridge watching them go. A dozen rebel machine guns guarded every movement he made.

Right after he landed at St. Lucia, fresh from the torment of his surprising experience, de Carvalho told the press: "It was all so sudden and unexpected that it seems like a nightmare. It was horrible to see how cruel men can be at times. They did not do more killing because our captain used his prestige and told the crew to be calm."

From St. Lucia, another dramatic account of the take-over came from Jose dos Reis, the ship's assistant purser: "It was like something out of one of those pirate stories you read as a boy," Reis said.

"At 1:00 A.M. Monday, a gang of about 50 to 100 passengers took over the *Santa Maria* off Caracas.

"They went up to the bridge, shot one officer and wounded a second officer. They took over everything with hardly any trouble.

"I was in my cabin and heard the noise on deck, so I went up to see what was going on.

"I found these pirates had warned the captain to do

what they told him or be shot. They were armed with tommy guns, grenades and pistols.

"I heard one of the crew say they were Communists, but I don't know.

"Anyway, they were all Portuguese.

"The passengers were all very frightened, but none of them—at least those I saw—tried to do anything, fight back or get away in the boats.

"It was useless. They were not armed, and where could they go? There was only the ocean around us.

"The captain, as far as I know, is still navigating. The pirates forced him. He had no choice in the matter.

"I'm pretty sure all the pirates were men. I didn't see any women. But they were a pretty mean looking lot of men.

"I didn't see any of the pirates try to harm any of the passengers."

Joao Peres de Sousa, 20, the officer who was shot in the back, also told his story to reporters: "It was all very sudden," he said. "I was in the chart room, plotting the ship's course, when I heard two shots.

"Almost at the same time, the bridge officer opened the door to the chart room, shouted 'Call the captain' and collapsed dead at my feet. I started to go below, then heard more shots. Something hit me and I lost consciousness."

Jose dos Reis, after landing in St. Lucia, came to New York, where he gave another and slightly different version of what happened on the liner. The main distinction between what he said in New York and what he told the press in St. Lucia was that many of the pirates were Spanish.

"When Captain Galvao came, gun in hand, to my captain's cabin," he said, "and told him that the Santa Maria was captured, he was accompanied by Professor Bello, a Spaniard.

"There were harsh words exchanged between my captain and Galvao. Professor Bello stopped the argument.

He told Galvao to cut off the discussion and get into action.

"There was a former Spanish naval officer among the boarders, and most of the invaders were Spanish-speaking. It was the impression of all of us that Galvao took orders from Bello."

When dos Reis first made this charge, there were many who regarded it as propaganda from the Salazar regime which was interested in making out a case for the non-Portuguese origin of the revolt. But events proved that dos Reis' story was essentially correct. Many of the pirates turned out to be of Spanish origin, and several of the officers who held a rank in the junta equivalent to Galvao's were Spaniards who had fought against Franco. The junta had interests wider than Salazar's regime—they had formed the grandiose vision of "liberating" the whole Iberian peninsula.

After Galvao had taken the bridge, he went to the captain's cabin, dos Reis related: "Then Galvao came in with his gang. He had a pistol in his hand. Bello was at his side. Their gang had submachine guns. My captain argued that piracy had been committed, and there was a quarrel.

"The ship's engines had been stopped. At Bello's orders, Galvao stopped arguing and ordered the engines started again. The engine crew worked under the muzzles of guns.

"The officers were all guarded and the captain was confined to his quarters. At 10 in the morning the passengers were gathered into the first class lounge and told in Portuguese, Spanish and English what had happened. They took the news quietly.

"The pool was put off limits to all because it was close to the bridge. Playing of music was halted. Food and water were rationed. The officers did their jobs at the peril of execution if they balked.

"Monday morning, the first officer told me to dress, that I was going ashore. The wounded men and the dead man—one of the wounded had died—were loaded into a motor lifeboat. I was not essential to the ship's

operation and I was freed to take care of the wounded. A crewman handled the lifeboat motor.

“At Santa Lucia we raised a white shirt on an oar and a police boat came out. They would not believe my story, but let us land because the wounded needed help.”

Chapter 2

THE EYEWITNESSES

CHAPTER TWO

THE EYEWITNESSES

ENGLISH-speaking passengers who boarded the 20,000-ton liner *Santa Maria* were handed a colored folder saying: "You'll find every shining moment packed with carefree enjoyment of life at sea. . . . Strange enchanting sights and sounds await you in foreign and intriguing ports of call." The passengers certainly got all the romance and intrigue they had bargained for; for once, the travel folder more than lived up to its promises.

Apparently, none of the passengers had any idea of what Galvao was up to; while some were awakened by the shooting, few gave it a second thought. It was only in the morning when Galvao assembled the passengers in the first-class lounge that they were told what had happened, and even then their ideas of what was going on were rather sketchy.

Mrs. Caroline Boyce, a widow from Baltimore, Maryland, woke up in the middle of the night and looked out her porthole. Mrs. Boyce is an amateur astronomer, so she could tell by looking at the stars that the *Santa Maria* had changed course, but she assumed that the

captain was turning to avoid some navigational hazard and went back to sleep. Mrs. Boyce recalled: "I saw we were going due east instead of west. About 6:30 I was awakened again and told to get dressed because someone was shot and killed. I looked out in the corridor and saw blood on the floor and the crew beginning to wash it away."

Mrs. Sarah Jane Smith of Johnstown, Pennsylvania, awoke about the same time when she felt a breeze. She remembered that the breeze had been on the other side of the ship since the air-conditioning had broken down at La Guera; she was grateful for a little air on such a hot night and went back to sleep.

Mr. Eben Bay of Paradise Cove, California, reported: "We were awakened (early in the morning) but did not realize what was going on. No passenger knew until 10 o'clock Monday morning when we were called to the various public rooms. Galvao spoke at some length about how he had seized Portugal's finest liner as part of the revolution which he believed was going on successfully in Lisbon to depose Salazar's puppet government."

Mrs. Floyd Preston of Lawrence, Kansas, recalled her feelings on the morning the rebels took over the *Santa Maria*. She said: "Some time after breakfast we were told we would not be going to Miami. That's all we were told. Then we saw all those machine guns, rifles and revolvers. From day to day we were told nothing."

Mr. Leon Miller of Springfield, Illinois, told of the feeling of helplessness he had in seeing armed men in control of the ship when he awoke on Monday morning: "The rebels had guns everywhere. We could almost feel guns at our backs all the time. Galvao told us what happened, explaining his position against the Portuguese government. He said we would be put off at a neutral port, but we were not told where."

To many of the passengers the affairs of the night meant only unexplained noises, noises that didn't sound particularly strange on a large ocean liner, and a rather sparse breakfast menu. (Tomato juice, toast, coffee, one passenger reported.) They learned from their waiters that

revolutionaries had taken over the ship, that death was suddenly a fellow-passenger. There was no mistaking the authenticity of the reports. Already the scent of danger had permeated the *Santa Maria*. The questions then were: What happens next? Is anyone steering the ship?

At nine a meeting was called. The Portuguese national anthem was played over the loudspeakers, and the passengers heard a long speech in Portuguese, then another in Spanish. Those who could understand a little Spanish caught phrases like “. . . is a man of honor . . . We want to do away with poverty.”

One passenger was confronted by a man with a gun who would not let her up on the deck for her usual walk. She noticed that there was blood in the hall leading to the hospital. At breakfast the maitre d’hotel looked strained and said that they could only have coffee and rolls. When they went topside the passenger realized that they were traveling east, toward Portugal, at top speed. A man with a gun patrolled the bridge.

Finally, after hearing long speeches that they couldn’t understand they were told in English that the Americans would not be harmed, that they would be five or six days steaming to an unknown destination.

As usual, rumors flew around the ship: 200 Castro revolutionaries had come aboard; only 10 had come aboard, some as passengers, some in packing cases. Some said they were heading for Africa, some believed they would change course for South America. They wondered if communications were still open, and if anyone “on the outside” knew of their situation. The armed men seemed to be everywhere.

At eleven that morning they sighted a Japanese freighter. The freighter slowed down almost to a stop, and everyone wondered if the men on the other ship sensed trouble. But then the freighter resumed normal speed and steamed away.

That night one passenger noticed a tall, good-looking young Spaniard, with a nice smile revealing white teeth. He was talking to one of the Portuguese officers. He had in his pocket a small pistol which he kept fingering.

As the trip wore on, the *Santa Maria* settled down into a routine which was not too different from what had gone on before the rebels took over. Service continued to be excellent; the food was substantial, even if the menus weren't as varied as they might have been; and the rebels were courteous towards the passengers.

Of course, the presence of armed men and the tense situation did worry some of the more nervous passengers. And in third-class and steerage, where the passengers were mainly Portuguese and Spanish, conditions were apparently far worse; food and water were rigorously rationed, some of the passengers became sick from being confined in the heat of the blazing Caribbean when the air-conditioning broke down. But all in all, considering what was happening the passengers didn't fare too badly.

Mr. John W. Dietz of Gainesville, Florida, said: "For those who like cruising, the trip was little different from any other—except for the guns. The food deteriorated, but it was substantial and enough. I didn't notice the water shortage. We passed the time playing cards and games, anything to make the best of the situation."

Dr. Irene M. Dunn of Claremont, California, added: "I imagine the passengers in tourist suffered more than we did in second. There was less water there and the sanitary facilities must have degenerated."

Some passengers planned to recapture the ship from Galvao but nothing came of the idea. Paul Venitian of Noorweik, the Netherlands, was one of the leaders of this counter-plot. He summed it up later: "After the ship was seized I thought we might try to take control of it away from the rebels. Three other men agreed with me and we discussed a plan of attack. We thought we might succeed because the rebels had only two machine guns and we could surprise them and overpower them. But there were only four of us ready to move. We couldn't speak Spanish or Portuguese, therefore we didn't know how many others might be with us. We were also afraid to talk too much about the plan. Finally, we decided we would have to drop it."

Later, when the Navy spotted the liner and sent planes

out to track her the passengers began to cheer up. Cecil Robert Henderson of Lincoln, Nebraska, said of this: "I really felt proud when I first saw an American naval plane overhead while we were headed for a unknown destination. I will never again object to paying income taxes."

On the first day of Galvao's rule, the *Santa Maria* put in at St. Lucia. The passengers were not informed of what was happening and were somewhat apprehensive. Some thought they were near Martinique or the Virgin Islands. One passenger was told it was Santa Teresia. As they watched the members of the crew being put over the side it was hard to understand what the rebel group thought they were accomplishing. It seemed to many of those caught up in this drama that it was a simple matter of piracy and murder.

It was noticed that the covers on the lifeboats had been rolled off. Many passengers were fearful that perhaps they would be set adrift in those boats, just as other victims of other mutinous escapades.

Mrs. Harberson, of Lincoln, Nebraska described her cabin being searched later that same day: "Three pistoleros came to cabin. Very polite. Want to see passports and asked if B. had gun. Looked under pillows."

Other passengers also remarked on the polite, but distant, attitude of the revolutionaries. They were certainly not overly hostile, but at the same time they kept close to their automatics. At that time it was rumored that they were headed toward a port in Brazil near Rio. The rebels also began accepting telegrams to be sent to worried relatives, but the passengers had no way of knowing whether or not these were being sent.

Mr. Delbert Smith of Johnstown, Pennsylvania, also recorded the effect of the "pistoleros" on people's nerves. He said: "The Galvao men were coolly courteous, but they frightened the women by flaunting the guns on their hips and mounting machine guns. The women bore up well. Some broke down in tears once or twice but bounced back fast."

Mr. Smith paid the crew high praise: "All through the unpleasant business the crew were magnificent. With all

their worries they did their utmost to help us. They deserve all the help they get."

The first sight of the Navy's search planes created a furor on board ship. All the passengers and crew were excited, relieved, and intensely grateful. Mrs. Harberson wrote in her diary: "U. S. Navy planes sighted. Great excitement. Circles around and around. Americans jubilant. Plane stays until about 7. Captain Galvao called meeting for 10. He said he had contacted agencies such as the World Court, U.N. and U.N. Commission on Human Rights. Is trying to find a neutral port where they will put us off. Then go on."

After the planes were sighted the rebels began to appear in full force. Previously, they had stayed in the background, except for the guards who stood sentry on the upper deck and in the corridors, armed with high-powered rifles. Now they mingled with the passengers, talking courteously with them.

There was still no reliable source for news, though by this time there was a feeling that an American warship was following the *Santa Maria*, somewhere below the horizon. Most of the passengers packed their bags and were ready to leave the ship at a moment's notice.

There weren't many complaints, but there was a general deterioration in the condition on the *Santa Maria* and her ability to take care of her paying guests. The cabins were no longer clean. Drinking water and towels were no longer changed in the cabins. The decks were not swabbed, and in some places they were littered with food, and debris. Soot covered everything. The air-conditioning system broke down and the cabins became almost intolerably hot.

Those traveling third class, most of whom were Latin working people, got the worst of it. One of the passengers reported that on January 25th there was only soup for lunch. It looked as if the ship was low on food, and everyone wondered what would happen if they didn't put into a port soon.

After the tension of the first few days, the rebel chieftain Galvao mingled freely with the passengers. Gen-

erally he made a favorable impression. One of the passengers claimed that he was instrumental in obtaining milk for the baby of one of the passengers. Another wrote, after he had first laid eyes on the rebel leader, that he looked about seventy years old, was small in stature, dressed in khaki, and had a soft, pleasant voice. He added that Galvao looked "very competent."

Mrs. Dietz of Gainesville, Florida, had her own vivid impression of the buccaneer: "Captain Galvao was so gallant. He kissed my hand as I left the ship. Once I complained to him that there was no shuffleboard and he had one painted for me right outside my cabin. I think he is nuts."

As time passed, some of the passengers began to realize the uniqueness of the situation they were in, and tried to turn it to their advantage. Two Americans went to Galvao on January 30th and offered \$4,000 for the movie rights of this experience. One American told another passenger that he didn't care what happened to him, he was getting on in years anyhow, but what was going to become of his new car down in the hold? Cut off from the world completely and under constant tension, many members of this strange pleasure cruise showed characteristics that were usually buried under years of established routine. A few showed great selfishness, they did not care what happened to anyone but themselves; others wanted to be the first to tell the story; others were only concerned about getting their money back. And more than a few demonstrated a quiet, stubborn courage that was most unexpected. Strangely though, the dominant feeling grew to be "what a wild, improbable lark!"

As the *Santa Maria's* voyage drew to a close, however, tension increased on board. Particularly after the arrival of the Navy and the conferences between Galvao and Admiral Smith when it was a question of days and eventually of hours before the passengers would be put ashore, the hopes and fears of the passengers reached their zenith.

Passengers got out on deck early to wait for Admiral Allen E. Smith of the U.S. Navy on the first day he was

rumored to be coming aboard. Some of them paid their stewards, some said good-bye. Some were approached by crewmen asking them to talk to the Admiral about getting the crew off the ship as well.

But the admiral didn't arrive that day. The skeptics said they knew he wasn't coming all along.

The next day the passengers were feeling very depressed. That night a plane came over the ship, flying very low, and raked the ship from stem to stern with its searchlight. The cabins were hot. A number of children were sick. Most of the passengers had no way of knowing for sure where they were, though they drew some comfort from the two ships standing by far off toward the horizon. It was the high point of tension. When a child uttered a sudden cry, someone jumped and muttered, "My lord, I thought they had come to kill us all."

On January 31, Admiral Smith finally came aboard the *Santa Maria* as she was lying off Recife. Everybody crowded the rail, watching the admiral come aboard. He and his staff disappeared immediately into the library, where the conference with Galvao was to take place. The Americans were then enabled to give their names and addresses to the American consul whom Admiral Smith had brought with him, but they were still not optimistic about getting off the ship.

While Admiral Smith was on the *Santa Maria* several parachutists leapt from hovering aircraft in an effort to jump onto the deck of the ship. One of them, a French journalist was picked up out of the water by a tug and brought aboard the liner. He was escorted to Galvao, still dripping from his plunge. Galvao seemed to be impressed by this and asked the journalist to lunch.

The same day Galvao met with the crew to try and persuade (or force) them to stay on board after the ship docked. But the crew would have none of it, they wanted to leave the ship, and they weren't afraid to say so. Galvao, who addressed the crew, got angry at the refusal, and demanded that everybody stay with the ship. At one point a member of Galvao's band pulled a gun on a heckling bystander.

There was more trouble with the crew the next day. By this time the *Santa Maria* was anchored just outside the three-mile limit and tempers were running very high. One of the passengers said that all Galvao wanted to do was run into shore, let the passengers off, go out again, and make another trip to shore to let the crew disembark. No one believed him. Galvao got madder, and that night, when some Brazilian officers appeared for another talk the passengers braced themselves for more trouble.

However by this time Galvao had nowhere to go. It was his turn to capitulate, and on February 2 the passengers and the crew of the *Santa Maria* felt solid ground under their feet at last. Their ordeal was over.

It had not been easy for Captain Maia and the officers and the men who served under him. From the very start of this bizarre escapade they felt it their duty to hinder the rebels in any way they could, despite the ever present submachine guns.

Armed men watched every strategic section of the ship. They didn't have enough men to watch each crew member, but when someone moved past a guard in one section the guard would report his mission to the next section. Thus the rebels could control all movement on the *Santa Maria*. It seemed to the officers of the ship like a method well-planned—and rehearsed—in advance.

When Captain Maia made an appearance on the bridge he knew that there would be rebel guns threatening him. And it was that way up to the time the ship finally anchored in the port of Recife.

Under Captain Maia's sub rosa direction, the crew did their best to sabotage the ship. They tried to use up the water supply so that the ship would be forced into dock. Galvao's navigator did not seem well trained, and whenever possible Captain Maia tried to confuse him, to make him even more unsure of his bearings. Of the radio messages that Galvao sent out to all points of the world, including Russia and Bulgaria, only one in ten was sent by Maia's radio operator, even though he had to work

at gun-point. Many of the messages radioed to the ship had a similar fate.

Relations between Captain Maia and Galvao were frostily correct and nothing more. The Captain did nothing except what he was forced to do. He avoided all contact with the rebels, remaining isolated in his room as much as possible. At all times a rebel machine gunner mounted guard outside his door, as well as that of his first officer.

Captain Maia had a low opinion of his captors, whom he regarded as "Communists" and/or "pirates."

The Captain and his men estimated the rebel force at about 60 men. They also claimed that, of these, only 16 to twenty were Portuguese. Captain Maia claimed that the rest were Spanish, Venezuelans and Cubans, and that some had been trained in Russian guerrilla techniques. Considering these circumstances Captain Maia regarded the rebels only as pirates who had unlawfully seized his ship. Their use of force against unarmed men was solid proof of their evil intent, according to the Captain; he stated later that if the crew had been armed they would have fought the rebels to the last man.

When the ship reached Recife, Captain Maia determined to get himself and his men onto Brazilian soil as quickly as possible. Once under the protection of Brazilian authorities the Captain told Galvao that unless he and his men were released from the ship with the passengers they would try to regain control of the ship. The implication was obvious: they would rather be dead than sail off again under Galvao.

Today, in retrospect, the Captain thinks this decision by the crew dumbfounded Galvao. He could not use force against the Portuguese crew. Brazilian authorities were already aboard, including Admiral Dias Fernandes himself. Galvao then proposed to let all sailors go who were not necessary for the proper maintenance of the ship, (at that time he still hoped to be able to set sail again). But the rebel leader soon realized that he was in a hopeless position. Even if he could get out to sea again, he did not have supplies or fuel enough to last more than a

few days, and then he would have to find some other port of refuge. He had no choice except to let everyone disembark and thus give up his whole venture.

As the passengers waited to come off the ship at Recife, some of the Portuguese and Spanish who had traveled third-class and steerage and had the roughest time of it, complained to reporters.

One woman called, "Some of us are afraid. The ones who complain too much are punished," and she made a gesture of slashing her throat.

One woman told reporters on the ship, "I am unhappy and I feel like crying. Look around," and she pointed to a man armed with a rifle.

A man standing nearby interrupted, "One wants to live, no? So why speak too much."

On shore some of the passengers seem not to have appreciated their twelve days of romance. An American woman said, "We were not scared, but we got pretty mad at times. Wouldn't you if you were trying to eat your breakfast and there were people with sub-machine guns and blackjacks sitting all around you?"

Malvina Cesar of Madrid said, "This is the last time I travel by boat."

Manuel Joaquim Lorenzo, returning to Portugal after 30 years in Venezuela, was furious: "This is a hell of a thing to happen to a man going home to retire after thirty years' work in a foreign country. If this is politics, I want no part of it."

But the puzzled attitude of Vasco Untero of Lisbon perhaps expresses best what all the passengers must have felt. He said: "The situation was so absurd I would not have believed it had I not lived it."

Chapter 3

THE BACKDROP

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THE trouble in Portugal is centuries old. Once, in the time of Prince Henry the Navigator, it was one of the leading nations of Europe. Portugal has since been in a steady decline. Perhaps the present crisis was originated by another European adventurer—Napoleon Bounoparte.

In the latter half of his reign, Napoleon's armies occupied the Iberian peninsula, including Portugal. The king fled to Brazil, then a Portuguese colony. When Napoleon was finally chased away Brazil, which had enjoyed a decade of relative independence, was reluctant to return to her colonial status. She declared her independence: this dealt a fatal blow to the Portuguese economy which needed the colonial revenues to balance the budget.

Throughout the 19th century, Portugal existed as a kind of comic-opera kingdom, perpetually in debt, perpetually involved in bloodless revolutions or *coup d'etats*. The two parties—the Regenerators and the Progressives—switched governments continually, but the changes meant little. The boredom of the population with this Tweedle-

dum-Tweedledee act gradually turned into irritation with the incompetence of both the kings and their ministers. In 1910, in one of the mildest revolutions ever staged (no one was killed, only two people wounded) the king fled on his royal yacht to London and a Republic was proclaimed.

But the Republic solved none of Portugal's problems. The new politicians had had no experience in dealing with the day-to-day problems of government; they tended to deal in lofty ideals which bore little relation to the facts. Some of the ablest, like Alfonso Costa, despite ability and intelligence, espoused anti-clerical programs which alienated them from a mass support.

In addition, the army and the nobility had never been reconciled to the idea of a democracy and were prone to interfere with the affairs of the infant republic at the slightest provocation. From 1910 through 1926, Portugal saw 16 rebellions and 40 changes of government. Only one President ever served his full term of office.

The country suffered during this anarchic period. Finance, in particular, was chaotic. Government after government ran up staggering deficits. The escudo, which had started on a par with the dollar, was worth less than a nickel after a decade of republican rule.

The climax came in 1925 when one of the leading banks in Portugal was found to have issued over \$10,000,000 of counterfeit money. It was the end of Portugal's experiment in democracy.

On May 28, 1926, Gen. Gomes da Costa issued a proclamation to the people of Portugal, recalling them to a sense of their national honor. (It is interesting to note that the present rebels base their plea, in part, on the same sense of honor defiled). "Portuguese!" da Costa shouted, "For men of honor and dignity the situation of the country is inadmissible. Bent low by the action of a licentious minority, the shamed nation feels itself dying. As for me, I openly revolt. And let all men of courage and dignity come with me to conquer or die by my side. To arms, Portugal!"

Da Costa marched on Lisbon (in emulation of Mus-

solini's march on Rome) and the government collapsed. Da Costa and Gen. Carmona took over, but it soon became clear that they had no more idea about the solution to Portugal's problems than the men of the Republic. Inflation continued, the budget was not balanced, and the escudo continued to fall.

In desperation the generals turned to an obscure professor of economics at the University of Coimbra, Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. Salazar accepted the post of Minister of Finance in 1926, but resigned after only five days in office when the generals refused to implement his proposals. When he returned in 1928, it was with the understanding that in the field of finance he was to possess dictatorial powers.

Antonio de Oliveira Salazar was born in Vimiera, a small village in Portugal in 1889. He received his early education at a seminary at Viseu, and later enrolled at Coimbra in order to study economics. After graduation he became a professor at the same university.

During the fiery years of the republic, Salazar took little part in the political life of the nation. Elected once to the National Assembly, Salazar returned to the University after a few days in Lisbon, dismayed by the disorder and tumult of parliamentary proceedings. He was convinced that politics as practiced during this period was undignified, essentially evil.

He had an aura of stability and solidity about him that must have appealed to many during these troubled years. "We are a nation of reforms," he once said, "but each time we reform, our position is worse. . . . It is a cruel illusion when political leaders beautify economic promises too vast for a nation's economic strength. For a government can supply no future for a people that the people do not provide for themselves."

So he arrived in Lisbon in 1928 as a schoolmaster who had been sent for to accomplish a certain task. He was turned to as a technician of finance, one who would do things carefully, up the budget, effect savings. He succeeded.

He started out by cutting government expenses. In

each of his first two years in office he cut the government payroll by one-third. "These people are our public servants," he said. "We don't need so many of them."

He raised taxes, something no previous politician had dared to do, and succeeded not only in balancing the budget but in putting a hole in the government's floating debt. By 1932 the debt was entirely paid off.

He was a devotee of low spending and balanced budgets. "As our national welfare continues to improve," he said, "we must continue to limit ourselves to a policy of plain good sense as opposed to a policy of too magnificent plans, plans so vast and magnificent that all our energy is spent in admiring them and no strength is left to carry them out."

Behind all his economic policies lay the conviction that Portugal was a poor nation, that little could be done to change this, and that, therefore, salvation lay in learning how to live on the edge of poverty.

In 1932, with the debt paid off and another balanced budget in store, Salazar could report to the nation in the midst of a world-wide depression: "When I think that rich countries are unable or unwilling to meet their debts, and great nations cannot balance their budgets; when I see the crisis of the soil, the crisis of wealth, the crisis of morality, and then turn my eyes to our own house, humble, no doubt, but quiet and earnest, I feel we can all be grateful for the efforts Portugal has made."

In 1932 Salazar became Prime Minister for the first time (he has held the post ever since) and set to work devising a new constitution for Portugal, a constitution embodying ideas that were somewhat more controversial than balanced budgets and economy.

The new constitution provided for a national assembly and president who were to be elected by a popular vote. But not everybody could vote—only the heads of families. In practice this meant that only about one Portuguese in every nine had the vote.

Another feature of the "New State" as Salazar termed it, was a Corporative Chamber, another legislative house with representatives chosen from the various professions

and trades (a feature borrowed from Mussolini's corporative state.)

Both of these provisions have their roots in Salazar's basic distrust of the individual and what he terms "liberalism." He feels that the individual is too weak and volatile a unit to base the State on.

This reveals an anti-democratic bias and Salazar makes no bones about his feelings on this score: "I believe democracy is a fiction," he has said. "I do not believe in universal suffrage. I do not believe in equality, but in hierarchy."

Salazar's basic feelings about this matter have been elaborated over the 30 years of his rule. He says that the type of government which he runs today in Portugal, while surely differing from the democracies, is the only correct one for his country.

He thinks that the Portuguese are "not suited" to democracy. They have had no experience with it and everything descends into anarchy, Salazar says, when they are confronted with it. "Latins need strong leaders," Salazar proclaims, feeling that passions run too high for orderly government without someone to give orders.

Salazar has often been criticized for restricting the activities of the press. Here again he contends that the Portuguese are not able to distinguish properly between liberty and anarchy. Too often in the past, he says, a free press had meant the freedom to libel any and all who are opposed to you.

The National Union, Salazar's own party, is not a perfect instrument for transmitting power, Salazar agrees, but it is suitable to the needs of the Portuguese people. The party and the regime have both evolved after a long process of experiment in Portugal and their record of stability—over 30 years in power—testify to the fact that they meet the needs of the Portuguese.

So the tidy government of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar kept Portugal in order through the chaotic years of the great depression and World War II (in which Portugal remained neutral). Salazar spoke often of the benefits of "order," little of the meaning of "freedom." He told the

Portuguese that they must live within their means. He told them about the "grace of being poor." He passed a law that houses in Lisbon were to be painted every two years. He saw that people obeyed this and other laws by raising an army of 65,000 men (large for a country of 9,000,000, it consumes 32% of the national budget), ordering an additional 60,000 into the National Militia (equivalent to our National Guard) and by having six separate police forces. (The remark that, "You can never find a cop when you want one," is not something that the Portuguese would understand.)

Despite a wave of prosperity during World War II, when neutral Portugal was able to sell her products to the belligerents at exorbitant prices, the country remained poor, the budgets stayed balanced, and there were no riots in the street, no wild orators preaching pie in the sky, no strong political passions expressed one way or the other. The New State had succeeded in doing what it had set out to do: it had brought order into Portuguese political and economic life.

Today Portugal, to the casual tourist, is an idyllic land with none of the hustle and commotion of the 20th century about it. Workers are organized into what are essentially medieval guilds (the right to strike is not recognized). Employers are members of small cartels called *gremios*. Fishing boats are painted with the Eye of God, and the public squares are filled with statues of the great 16th century navigators. In the country one can still see black-shawled old women, sheltered by umbrellas from the hot noonday sun, ambling peacefully along on their donkeys. In cafés women sing of *saudade* (homesickness) and unrequited love. All is calm, clean and peaceful.

But what to the hurried American looks like a little bit of heaven from another time, is often irksome to the Portuguese. "Yes," they say, "there is order in the streets, but disorder in our bellies." Portugal has the lowest standard of living of any country in Western Europe. At least 40 percent of the people are illiterate. Salazar, and his economy, has done little to stimulate economic

growth. Many complain that the famous balanced budget is only achieved at the cost of exorbitant taxes on the people least able to bear it, the rural farmers who compose 60 percent of the population.

Salazar is unimpressed by these cries of anger. "My aim is not to please," he has said, "but to do a competent job."

Today the head of state is 71 years old, a man no longer in the prime of life. (He had pneumonia in 1959 and he suffers from a heart condition.) Before 1937 he lived in various simply furnished apartments around Lisbon, but after a bomb exploded in one of them the police insisted that he move to his present apartments in a large walled mansion which is amply protected by the PIDE (the secret police). He dresses simply favoring blue serge suits, and he still wears the old-fashioned high shoes with hooks. He has never married and is in fact something of a misogynist. (Women have never been granted any political rights in the New State).

An intensely religious man, who has been described as a "mystic devoted to figures" he attends 6:30 Mass daily. He lives on the small salary of \$500 per month which he considers adequate. He drinks little, mainly port diluted with water, and this only at meals. He does not smoke and permits no one to smoke in his presence.

Salazar points with pride to the 10,500 miles of highways that have been constructed in Portugal under his regime, and guides from the Ministry of Propaganda are anxious to show the tourist the more than 20,000 units of inexpensive housing that have been constructed for workers.

Salazar supporters point out that the Prime Minister realizes that all is not perfect in Portugal and speak of his great compassion for the plight of the Portuguese worker. They tell the story of his being visited by a delegation which wanted money for a group of Portuguese singers who wanted to make a tour of Brazil. "How can I give money for those who sing," Salazar replied, "when I do not have enough for those who cry."

Salazar is still "the world's most durable dictator" as

he had been dubbed by both friends and enemies. But signs of discontent are starting to multiply. "But there is no liberty here," a member of the intelligentsia told the Saturday Evening Post's Toni Howard, "none at all! No freedom for the press, for the people, no vote any more, no civil liberties of any kind! He treats us like children, and like backward children at that. And he isn't even a good economist. Or else he's keeping us poor on purpose."

The lack of liberty and the persistent poverty are the main complaints of those opposed to Salazar. After 30 years of decent poverty, some of the people want to take a chance on freedom, even if it means a return to the rowdy days of the republic.

The intellectuals charge that Salazar is keeping the country quiet on "*Fado*, Fatima, and Football,"—that is the national music, the national saint, and the national sport. They feel that it is time to trade in the balanced budget for the balanced diet.

The first rumbling of dissatisfaction came after the war in a wave of strikes that hit the northern industrial region. The strikers were harshly repressed by the police, their factories closed until they agreed to return to work.

Then in 1948, in an attempt to appease public opinion in the western democracies, Salazar permitted the first "free" elections since he had assumed power. Gen. Norton de Mattos ran against Gen. Carmona, who had held the office since 1928.

To Salazar's evident surprise Gen. Norton de Mattos took the election seriously. A man over 80 years old, he nevertheless campaigned vigorously. Salazar began to be alarmed and his war minister, Col. Santos Costa, was quoted as saying that the army might be forced to intervene if the elections went the wrong way.

Then, three days before the election was to take place, Norton de Mattos withdrew, charging that the government had denied him a fair opportunity to present his case. Salazar had triumphed, but the "showcase" election had been embarrassing to the New State.

Then on April 18, 1951, General Carmona died. The

constitution called for new elections and Salazar nominated General Francisco Lopes to run for the regime, and permitted the opposition to nominate Admiral Manuel de Quintao Meireles. Admiral Meireles ran a strong campaign but he too withdrew three days before the election, making charges similar to those which had been issued by Norton de Mattos.

Then in 1953, apparently still determined to prove that Portugal was a democracy, Salazar permitted the opposition to name a slate of candidates for the National Assembly. They put up 28 candidates for the Assembly's 120 seats. In the districts they contested they averaged only 16.7 percent of the vote and won not a single seat. After the election, Salazar again clamped on the censorship and the opposition newspaper *Republica* headlined its last issue: "Silence! Silence! Portugal Returns to Her Sad Fate."

But the causes of unrest remained. The economy was still stagnant, what wealth there was remained concentrated in the hands of the "One-hundred families," and while there was an increasing amount of technical training for workers, Salazar still felt that a liberal higher education was "ideologically dangerous."

So fireworks were expected when in 1958 Humberto da Silva Delgado announced that he would oppose Salazar's candidate for the presidency, Admiral Americ Tomas.

Delgado, a lean, hard, air-force general, with hypnotic black eyes, had not always been opposed to Salazar. He was born in Torre Novas in 1906 and from 1916 to 1925 attended first the *Colegio Militar*, then the *Escola Militar*, graduating from the latter first in his class.

In the rioting that marked the end of the republic Delgado was wounded, and he was one of the group of young officers who installed Carmona and later Salazar.

He served the regime faithfully for many years. During the second World War he was instrumental in obtaining bases for the RAF in the Azores. After the war he was cited as an Honorary Commander, Military Division, of the Order of the British Empire. The citation read in part: "Major Delgado worked for some 18 months on

the preparations of a base in the Azores which he realized from the start was to be used by the British aircraft in the Battle of the Atlantic. He put the achievement of this before everything else. . . . He was activated purely by a sincere conviction that the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and the Anglo-Portuguese cooperation in the Atlantic comprised the only sure basis for the future relations of the two countries. He combined to an extraordinarily successful degree the qualities of staff officer and politician and staked his whole future on what, for political purposes, was on behalf of the Allies."

For ten years after the war he served as Portuguese representative in Canada and as the Portuguese representative to the North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) group in Washington. Delgado had always been a friend of America and England and he has since claimed that it was in these countries that he formed the desire to bring a greater measure of freedom to his own country.

But aside from his connections in England and the United States, General Delgado's exclusively military background does not suggest a revolutionist or troublemaker. General Delgado has always been proud of his service in the armed forces. During the election he received foreign correspondents wearing two pearl-handled revolvers and he let it be known that they were always loaded, a stroke reminiscent of General Patton or Ridgeway more than of a fire-eating anarchist.

Delgado has always been known for the way he cherishes the insignia of his rank. He often appeared in public "so encrusted with gold braid, decorations and epaulets that he looks like Bert Lahr playing a field marshal of Lichtenstein."

So at first Delgado's announcement that he would campaign was treated with contempt. An official of the government confided to a foreign correspondent that Delgado was "nuts" and that he would do anything—even run for office—to attract attention. Others thought that the flamboyant Delgado was inspired more by envy of Salazar's right-hand man, austere, dour, Colonel Santos Costa, than by any love for freedom in the ab-

stract. They regarded his campaign as a move to further his position in the regime, the idea being that he would withdraw after a while and pledge his devotion anew to Prime Minister Salazar in return for a more important post.

But there was evidently more to it than that, for Delgado surprised his critics by running one of the toughest campaigns in Portuguese history. Perhaps Delgado's opposition to Salazar is based on the differences in their personalities. Delgado is a romantic, a swashbuckler, a rebel against the establishment; it is unlikely that such a person liked attending the classroom which the pedantic Salazar has been holding for the past 30 years. Delgado may just feel that Portugal is too dull—that it needs waking up, excitement in its political life. Salazar is notoriously opposed to excitement of any kind, particularly political.

At any rate, Delgado's campaign, if it did nothing else, certainly stirred things up. One foreign observer, by no means uncritical of the air-force general, said of Delgado: "He is brilliant and has guts but wouldn't last a minute if elected. He has no public backing, no machine, very little program. He is a complete egoist. What he had done is wake up Portugal and that's the best thing that has happened here in thirty years."

Delgado proved to be a fiery orator who attracted excited crowds wherever he went. Soon the various opposition groups had dropped plans to run candidates of their own and lined up behind Delgado. Thus Delgado became the leader of an uneasy coalition of monarchists, Liberal Catholics, *Accio Socialistas* (socialists), with a sprinkling of Communists, united on nothing except their opposition to Salazar. Delgado who had said, "I am not a politician. We have had no parties in Portugal for thirty years. . . . I don't stand for any particular party. I stand for justice and historical freedom," was well-suited to be their spokesman.

The essence of Delgado's campaign was opposition to Salazar. He had a modest program which may have seemed too mild to some of his more radical supporters.

It included lifting the censorship, but keeping the army strong. Delgado did not favor the multiplication of parties which had so hampered the old republic. To his confidants he remarked that he did not favor turning Portugal into another France (this was before de Gaulle). "One or two parties is enough," he said repeatedly. "In a year or two it would all work out smoothly."

But if his positive program was slight, his criticism of Salazar was hard-hitting. "Everywhere I go in Portugal," he shouted, "crowds come out to see me. It is not for me that they come. It is because they are opposed to this regime. They are weary after thirty years. They want a change. We all want a change." And he added that he would "throw Salazar out" if he were elected.

Delgado went even further. He warned that civil war might result if he were not given a fair opportunity to present his case to the electorate. And he told a foreign correspondent: "In a free election I would win 80 percent of the vote."

The Salazar regime responded in a somewhat heavy-handed fashion. Typical of many incidents, was a riot caused by one of Delgado's scheduled appearances in Oporto, the traditional center for the opposition in the industrial north. Delgado and a crowd of supporters boarded the crack Lisbon-Oporto train so he could speak at a rally set for the time when the offices and shops in Oporto let out. The train—The Firecracker—speeded north, while crowds in Oporto, attracted by the convenient hour and curiosity to see what the opposition was up to, built up near the Oporto railroad station. They soon reached alarming proportions, at least to the local branch of the P.I.D.E., Portugal's secret police.

The police decided that a Delgado speech before such a mass might easily result in a riot—or many Delgado votes come election day. They stopped the Firecracker at a suburban station a few miles short of its destination and pulled Delgado from the train. There would be none of his fancy rhetoric that day, they informed him.

Meanwhile, in Oporto, the mob was growing ever more

boisterous and threatening. Hours passed and still there was no sign of Delgado. Finally, rumors filtered through about what had happened on board the Firecracker. The crowd pressed forward to the railroad station; the police held them back, wielded their black-jacks on some who forced their way through.

The crowd was angry. They pried up Oporto's basalt paving stones and started using them on the police. A riot ensued in which several people died and many (including some policemen) were injured.

After this the P.I.D.E. adopted a firmer attitude. They ordered a halt to street electioneering. Police tried to break up crowds when Delgado spoke. Ballots listing Delgado as a candidate were confiscated (on election day voters who wished to, had to write in his name). Political workers who favored Delgado were subject to police harassment and in some cases to arrest. On election day, Viera de Almeida, a 70-year old philosopher who had served as Delgado's campaign manager was arrested.

Speakers for Salazar accused Delgado of being an adventurer. They claimed that he had lowered the national reputation for "serious" (that is, non-controversial) politics. They accused him alternately of being a "tool of Washington" and a Communist.

Despite all this Delgado polled approximately 25 percent of the vote. When the result was announced, Delgado charged fraud, claiming "I was robbed."

But he refused to give up the struggle. "I don't care what they (the regime) do with me after this election," he declared. "They are sure to kick me out of my job as head of civil aviation. They will trump up some charge of subversion against me. I'm not afraid."

In elaborating his charges of fraud at the polls, Delgado again hit hard at Salazar: "Are we an independent and civilized nation or a savage territory occupied by foreigners, supported by the force of police and arms turning away from intelligence and the constitutional rights of the population?" he asked.

To the suggestion that he had better retire from political life or else wind up in jail, Delgado declared: "In jail or

out of jail, I am a kind of myth. I want to remain a myth—an anti-Salazar myth.”

Salazar seemed to be satisfied with the results of the election. In a speech following the election, he declared that the Portuguese had given his regime an overwhelming endorsement. The kind of democracy favored by Delgado, he sneered, would mean “a descent into chaos.” When supporters of Delgado tried to stir up strikes in the district around Oporto where Delgado had received most of his support, Salazar reminded them that “to strike is a crime” and the strikes were failures.

But privately, the friends of the regime admitted that Delgado’s 25 percent of the vote had been an “unpleasant shock” to Salazar. The regime took steps to see that it would not happen again.

First the constitution was changed. The president in the future was not to be chosen by the district vote of even the limited electorate which had used the polls in 1958. Presidents would now be chosen by the National Assembly, all of whom were hand-picked by Salazar.

In a speech to the assembly on July 2, 1959 Salazar declared, “It’s not convenient to have an opposition party.”

Even before this, Salazar had taken steps to eliminate any active opposition to the New State. After the election, censorship was reinstated on an even more stringent basis. The Bishop of Oporto, Dom Antonio Serrera Gomez, who had addressed a letter to Salazar telling him in effect that the New State was little more than a device to rob the poor, found that he was unable to return to Portugal after a vacation in France.

Gen. Delgado, as he had predicted, soon found himself in serious trouble with the regime. In October he spoke at a rally in honor of the heroes of the republic. The rally was broken up by police when the “crowd got out of hand” and Delgado was informed that this was the last occasion on which he was to exercise his oratorical talents for a while. In January, he lost his post as head of civil aviation. A few days later he sought refuge in the Brazilian Embassy and was accepted by Ambassador Alfredo Lins.

This set off a new uproar. Delgado charged that he was about to be arrested for opposing Salazar. The regime ridiculed his charges, said it was nonsense for a man who had never been accused of any crime to claim that he was a political refugee. But whether Delgado had been threatened with loss of freedom or not, his seeking refuge confirmed for the opposition that he would go on fighting Salazar and put him in the role of permanent leader of the opposition. It also, like everything Delgado does, attracted considerable public attention.

In April, after months of protracted negotiation, Humberto da Silva Delgado, left for exile in Brazil. He arrived in Rio de Janeiro on April 21, 1959, but he said the fight was not over. He called the Salazar regime "rotten," said that it might collapse "at any time." As for his personal plans, he pledged that "with obvious limitations" he would continue the struggle against Salazar.

But the struggle, for the moment, was ebbing. On May 7, 1959 the P.I.D.E. announced that they had arrested 31 men, including a number of army officers, and in so doing had crushed a "Communist" plot to overthrow the government. They linked the plotters to Delgado, and when questioned the General did not deny this.

Later in the same month, Salazar received support from an important quarter. President Eisenhower visited Lisbon, in a tour of the NATO countries, and praised Salazar for his allegiance to the Western alliance.

On June 23, 1959 a nine-page petition was handed to Salazar, signed by a number of middle-class professional people protesting against "police brutality." But it was the last sputter from the opposition. Delgado was in Brazil, there would be no more dangerous elections, the President of the United States had just complimented the Prime Minister, the New State was safe. Salazar pledged the nation anew to "God, Country, Authority, Family, and Work."

Chapter 4

THE REBEL

CHAPTER FOUR

THE REBEL

CAPTAIN Henrique Galvao, the third member of our cast of characters, is in some respects the most fascinating of this Latin triumvirate. Like Delgado, he was a staunch supporter of the regime for many years. But Delgado, despite all the medals on his chest, his bursts of temper, and his pearl-handled revolvers was accounted a fairly solid citizen. This was not true of Galvao.

There is a story they tell of Galvao's student days at the Infantry School in Lisbon. True or not, it illustrates perfectly the kind of reputation the man has.

The Infantry School is located in an old Portuguese convent. Many of the doors of the convent date from the 18th century and are constructed of heavy Brazilian mahogany, intricately carved in the reigning Roccoco style of the day. They are works of delicate craftsmanship, minor works of art and they are worth a great deal of money. The story is that one night young Henrique Galvao was noticed by the guard at one of these intricately carved doors. He was challenged, gave some kind of trivial excuse and, the guard assumed, returned to his quarters.

But the next morning the door was gone and Cadet Galvao was suddenly wealthy.

When the Portuguese tell this story they place as much emphasis on the unique manner of stealing as on the fact that something disappeared. They admire a thief who has the courage and audacity to walk off with an immense wooden door (the size must be emphasized—they are closer to gates to a fortress than doors to an apartment) much more than they condemn him. Galvao they say, is unique, closer to a 16th century adventurer than a 20th century pickpocket.

And when later as head of the national broadcasting company in Portugal, Galvao accumulated an income far in excess of his official salary by, it is alleged, taking bribes from performers who wanted to appear in this medium (an early form of payola), the Portuguese again were not outraged. Still later, Galvao appeared as head of the exposition in 1940 celebrating the third centenary of Portugal's liberation from Spain, and the eighth centenary of the birth of the country; again, he made money hand over fist, and the Portuguese were neither surprised nor particularly shocked.

All this time, of course, he was a firm supporter of the regime, and the regime in turn supported him by appointing him to these choice positions. But he was doing other things. He became one of Portugal's leading playwrights (Delgado has also written four plays), he was something of a Casanova (at his trial both his wife and girl friend attended and wept copiously at the proper moments), and he became a big-game hunter and a writer of personal adventure stories which have been compared favorably to Hemingway's.

The list of jobs which Galvao held under the Salazar regime is impressive. It indicates that somebody up there liked him, and that somebody was probably Salazar himself. Maybe the Prime Minister was attracted to this swash-buckler simply because he was the complete opposite of the schoolmaster of Portugal. Maybe Galvao's frankness in saying what he thinks, distinguished him in a government notorious for the number of bureaucratic syncophants it

employs. Whatever it was, Galvao had his chance at the pickings and while they lasted they were reportedly very good.

After a short period of service in the Army he was sent to Angola where he was successively Governor of Huila, assistant to the High Commissioner, assistant to the Governor General, and finally, in 1936, High Inspector of Colonial Administration. In the latter post, as someone remarked at his trial, he could have gotten rich "simply by turning his back."

In Portugal he organized the Colonial Fair at Oporto in 1934 and was director of the Lisbon fair and head of the national broadcasting company.

It was during a stay in Angola in the 40's, when he was High Colonial Inspector and a delegate from that province to the National Assembly that he made the famous report which started all his trouble with Salazar.

It is hard to know why Galvao turned against the regime. There is a story that the then governor of Angola refused to do a favor for Galvao's brother Carlo, but gossip like this is so common in Salazar's Portugal that it is difficult to believe any of it. Perhaps he was disgusted at the corruption he found in the African colony, but to anyone who knew the facts of life (and Galvao must have) this should have been an old story, even if he was as poor and honest as the defense witnesses at his later trial insisted.

But perhaps the best clue to Galvao's action is in the report itself. It is one thing to take a little money under the table when everyone else in the office is doing the same thing. It is another to connive with brutal exploiters at conditions "worse than slavery" which is what Galvao's report charges. Petty thievery, bribe-taking, even large scale robbery are not his concern. He is concerned about man's inhumanity to man as perpetrated, so he charges, in the Portuguese colony of Angola.

The London Observer of Sunday, January 29, 1961, published an extensive summary of this report. If what Galvao charges in it is true, it would take a cold-blooded man not to wince at the spectacle of injustice which it portrays.

Angola is rich in natural resources. It has an output in industrial diamonds of 785,000 carats a year—more than five percent of the world's total. Yet it barely pays its way in the limping Portuguese economy. What is wrong in Angola, Galvao asks.

The answer is, according to the former High Colonial Inspector, that the human resources of the colony are used inefficiently. In other words, the natives are so mistreated that they do not do the work they are capable of and which the colony needs if it is to be put on a sound financial basis.

Galvao's documentation is impressive and is supported by recent complaints both here (at the U.N.) and in the colony of African groups, though it is, of course, hard for an observer in this country to have much personal knowledge of the facts of the case. But Galvao was in a position to know what he was talking about.

Galvao starts by saying that for years there has been a wave of emigration from Portugal's three African colonies, Angola, Mozambique and Guinea. It is the custom in Angola to let natives cross the frontier to work in other African territories. Returning natives bring back stories of better conditions beyond the border; they become "propagandists for emigration." The resulting emigration has created a situation of "very demographic anemia": in other words, too few people to work the resources of the colony.

In the frontier regions, Galvao says he no longer saw any able-bodied men; the native kraals were places of desolation containing only old men, women and the sick. "The population flees en masse and deserts the land and its home and the territories become empty."

Galvao's report estimates that Angola has lost 1,000,000 natives through emigration in the preceding ten years.

The report states that medical services in the colony are almost non-existent. "I assert," Galvao said, "that the health service for the natives of Guinea, Angola and Mozambique—both the service paid for by the State and that paid for by private industry and private organizations—does not exist, except for very rare local exceptions."

The infant mortality rate in particular appalled Galvao. He cites the "dreadful rate of infant mortality" and says, "We are suffering as though from the devastations of fire, having no water, no pumps, no firemen. Or more precisely, having no water available, no efficient pumps and no trained firemen. Therefore, it is not surprising that infant mortality goes up to 60 percent."

Why are the health services in such poor condition? Galvao asks. Because nobody cares. "Figures are mute, static," he says. "They don't shout, they don't tell of pain. One needs to go and see for oneself, one needs to encourage those who want to see, instead of condemning them to places of exile as the inconvenient ones."

There is a conspiracy of lies in Angola, Galvao charged. In order to arrive at the truth one must somehow get it "from the administrative officers—who are afraid to report truthfully—what they dare to say only on special occasions." It is necessary to talk to the natives themselves to break down the barrier of the official reports. People should be able to "listen to missionaries saying in friendly chats what they dare not write in their reports."

The medical service in the colony is absurd and tragic, Galvao wrote. "Doctors try to escape going into the interior and are still concentrated in the most important urban centres; hospitals still lack elementary sanitary arrangements and many places which have a strategic need for a health service are still without hospitals. More doctors and assistants are needed; coordination between the health and administrative services is deficient.

"One could say that pre- and post-natal care, infant welfare, the campaigns against malaria, sleeping sickness and other indigenous diseases are pure formalities.

"A bureaucratic network and a complexity of conflicting personal interests combine to reduce everything to a mere facade. The gravest fact is that this is not understood by those who come to see the health services at work or who make prearranged visits to hospitals, where they only sweep the floors and clean the baths for the visitors' benefit."

Cases of mortality rates of 40 percent among workers are common, Galvao says.

The result of this neglect: "A great part of the population flees abroad," Galvao says, "the rest moves toward physical ruin. The remedies adopted by us are, in a general way, bureaucratic where they can be found at all."

Even more alarming is the labor situation. "We all know," Galvao says, "the contrast between ideas and principles embodied in the law and the realities of compulsory labor. We have a very long way to go before labor is really free and voluntary." In other words, there is little difference between compulsory labor and what most people would call slavery.

There is a severe labor shortage in the colony, Galvao reports. There are 1,023,717 working age males, but of these only 746,589 were accounted fit to work. "In other words, for several reasons, but mostly due to physical incapacity 459,128 males (over 33 percent in the working-age group) are unable to work."

The government operates "recruiting centers" to supply labor for private contractors and for its own needs. For one reason or another 22 percent of the natives reporting to these centers are either rejected or desert. To cover the shortage of labor the government, Galvao claims, resorted to violence. In one of the most damning statements in the report he says, "Only the dead are really exempt from compulsory labor."

In Angola, Galvao reported, "the government has become quite deliberately the main recruiter and distributor of native labor to a point where settlers call on the Department of Native Affairs with written demands for a 'supply of labor' which they hand in without embarrassment. The term 'supply' is used in the same way as if one were buying goods . . . With the continuation and abuse of this practice, settlers have got used to the idea that the Government has an obligation to supply them with labor."

All this, Galvao adds, is condemned by law, but recommended in confidential orders. Workers are supplied "while they last" while "at the same time we go on mak-

ing propaganda speeches proclaiming the most pious intentions and purposes of humanity."

The conditions under which the natives work are awful, Galvao claims. "In some respects," he says, "the situation is more grave than that created by pure slavery. Under slavery the bought man, acquired as a head of cattle, was regarded as an asset by his master. He was interested in keeping him healthy and strong and agile in the same way as he would look after his horse or his bull.

"Today, the native is not bought—he is simply rented from the Government, though he may have the status of a free man. His master could hardly care less if he falls ill or dies as long as he goes on working while he lives . . . When he becomes unable to work or when he dies the master can always ask to be supplied with other laborers."

Although some employers have lost as many as 35 percent of their workers, the government continues to supply them with more natives.

"We cannot maintain this policy," Galvao concluded. "We cannot allow to continue undisturbed the serenity or indifference of those who consent to it and have apparently got used to it. I will refrain from citing cases and examples, but I am ready to reveal them to the Government as I have insistently done over the last ten years."

Galvao said that the natives who volunteered for labor were not permitted to choose their own employer, but were instead assigned by the government so that they would get the minimum salary which the law allowed.

Other workers were supplied by a contract (*contracto*) with native chieftans. Recruiters generally had to be employed because the natives hated and feared the *contracto*. "It is useless," Galvao said, "to go into details about the hateful aspects these operations imply."

As a general rule the native mortality rate ran as high as 20 to 30 percent on these *contractos*, Galvao claimed.

The Government also needed labor for its own projects, and since the local departments frequently were short of funds they forced natives to work on roads and Government farms without salary and in some cases without food.

Despite noble plans, Galvao said, the technical services

offered by the government were inadequate and benefited only the Portuguese exploitation companies.

"The native farmers know only the presence of overseers, authorities, and other agents of propaganda," Galvao said, "who teach them nothing and impose on them the need to cultivate only the required commodity wherever they want it, in good or bad soil, sometimes involving loss to their own food crops. We could cite, not as exceptions, but as a general rule, distasteful cases of violence, of lack of sense, which result in the destruction of the population."

Finally, Galvao said, the attitude of the employers does nothing to improve the situation. The employers, he charges, resist in all possible ways a fair wage policy; treat the natives with the utmost harshness, beat them and generally mistreat them—"The idea that the native is simply a beast of burden still prevails! the indifference to the physical and moral health of their laborers is evident."

Further, Galvao said, labor was wasted, everything being done manually; the quality and moral character of the recruiters was poor; merchants frequently cheated the natives; housing conditions were terrible; and the "extermination spirit" of the 19th century colonizers still prevailed in many places.

The problem would not admit of an easy solution, Galvao said, but "the fact that we have known all this for ten years and that not a single effective measure to solve the problem" has been taken is to the everlasting dishonor of the regime.

Galvao stood before the surprised National Assembly and read out his final statement in ringing tones of defiance. "I take the full responsibility to prove that all I say is true," he said. "You can only criticize me for not saying the whole truth or rather that I do not describe all the aspects of the problem. But that would be a matter for many books and take many hours."

The Assembly heard Galvao's charges in silence. They were stunned. Not so much at the charges themselves: everyone knew that the situation in Angola was far from ideal, but at Galvao's temerity in daring to accuse the

Government itself of complicity in these events. It was just the sort of thing that was definitely not done. It was bad form, shockingly bad taste. It was as if a crowd at a British cricket match had suddenly started shouting, "We've been robbed."

The Assembly had been, in a manner of speaking, prepared for some kind of fireworks from the volatile Galvao. It had been rumoured for months that he had not found things in Angola up to snuff, and had prepared a rather sensational report. But nobody had ever expected him actually to read it. It was simply assumed around Lisbon that he was using it to angle for a better job with the government.

There had been reports that the government had alternately threatened him and tried to bribe him, to stop him from doing anything foolish. But now he had let the cat out of the bag. The reaction in the Assembly was that they had just seen a man reading his own death warrant—if not literally, at least politically.

Of course, something had to be done about charges such as these made in the National Assembly itself. An investigation followed and several of the officials responsible for Angola were dismissed.

But Galvao soon felt the repercussions. He resigned his post as Colonial Inspector and when the list of "acceptable" delegates (acceptable to the Salazar government, that is) was posted, Galvao's name was not among them.

And then, surprisingly enough, the regime changed its tactics. In the teeth of a great deal of opposition from his own loyal associates, Salazar called in Galvao and gave him one last chance. He said that while it was still impossible to let him be a delegate to the National Assembly from Angola, he was perfectly willing to let him run from the District of Setubal (Portugal's third largest city) as the government candidate. When Galvao refused this offer, he was marked forever as a member of the opposition.

In 1951, Galvao worked for the election of Admiral Meirelles, the Opposition candidate who eventually withdrew from the race.

After the election, Galvao and a group of the other leading members of the opposition, realizing that the two months of election activity immediately preceding the campaign were not enough to organize for effective political action, took steps to establish a permanent organization which would coordinate and supervise all aspects of the opposition.

They set up their headquarters in a Lisbon office building and immediately got in touch with the Minister of the Interior so that they could obtain the permits necessary to carry on their work. This was necessary because any form of clandestine political activity in Portugal is outlawed, and the group didn't want to run the risk of being arrested.

Of course, they were aware that the P.I.D.E. (secret police) was keeping a watchful eye on them, but they were not particularly worried. They did not see how the police could stop them from engaging in a form of activity which was specifically permitted by Salazar's constitution of 1933, as long as they went about it publicly and with the full permission of the authorities.

So the work of the Organizacao Civica Nacional went forward. A staff was hired (which included one member of the P.I.D.E.), meetings were held and a great deal of correspondence was exchanged with the Ministry of the Interior. Then one day there was a knock on the door, the P.I.D.E. burst into the office, arrested everybody who was there and rummaged through the files for incriminating evidence. According to the police the N.C.O. had been plotting to overthrow the government.

Among those arrested was Henrique Galvao. He was interrogated frequently by the P.I.D.E. but was uncooperative. His defiant attitude did not help his defense. He insisted that there had been no plot, but just as often repeated that the regime was rotten and that he would be happy to see an end of it.

His attitude before the trial and in court is best exemplified by part of a long statement he made at a pre-trial examination by the chief judge of the court which tried the case. He was examined at this hearing by a mem-

ber of the P.I.D.E. and the following is believed to be an accurate reproduction of the P.I.D.E.'s report on the interrogation.

(I am indebted for this material and for most of the other information regarding the trial to Maria Archer's book, "Os Ultimos Dias do Fascismo Portugues—The Last Days of Portuguese Fascism—published in Brazil).

"He (throughout the statement the "he" referred to is Galvao) did not prepare, organize, and he did not cooperate in any projects concerned with revolutionary movements or with the overthrow of the Government by force, nor did he, for such a purpose, recruit or try to recruit anybody. Nevertheless, he does not deny and even confesses with pride that he deeply wished and continues to wish, not only that the Government be deposed, but also for the liquidation of the police and the arbitrary system which supports them: a system which is against the letter of the Constitution and whose spirit and institutions are absolutely antagonistic to the aims inspiring the military movement of May 28, 1926 (the movement which brought the regime to power).

"As a Portuguese citizen, a member of the Armed Forces, a public servant, and even as a European, he feels downgraded, betrayed and humiliated by the deviations to which the thought and intentions of the founders of the regime have been progressively submitted, deviations which have made the country a feudal domain under an oligarchy of university teachers, bureaucrats, men of affairs (often illegal affairs) and other corrupt elements enjoying arbitrary powers and making eternal the transitional dictatorship established by the May 28th movement through an array of legal sophistries.

"As a Western European and therefore adamantly anti-communist he feels downgraded and betrayed, seeing that in the name of the country the Government joined the Atlantic Pact (NATO), while acting like the Communist governments, with the same spirit of dictatorial violence over bodies and souls, finding its mainstay in the censorship of all the rights of the human spirit, on a (secret)

police modeled after the Cheka and Gestapo, and functioning with laws, without laws, and against laws, and on propaganda; in a word, on all the basic institutions of Communist countries long dishonored and contradicting the spirit of Christian civilization.

“As a public servant and as a deputy he was persecuted and slandered because, sacrificing his interest to his duty and in accordance with his Constitutional rights, he denounced the corruption and incompetence of the Administration.

“When he gave his modest cooperation to the movement of May 28th and later fought for the regime it had established, he was not inspired by partisan interests, but by spontaneous and independent urges of a Portuguese citizen and a member of the armed forces. His actions, as well as those of men far more brilliantly engaged in that movement, were then and still are now (although at the present without sincerity) considered as a legitimate reaction of members of the armed forces against a deplorable state of affairs managed by those who took advantage of this state of affairs against the interests of the nation.

“Today, in the face of a situation he considers infinitely more dangerous than the previous one to the fate of the nation, to the moral and intellectual formation of coming generations and to the political interests of the co-partners in the Atlantic Pact, he obeys the same patriotic feelings and impulses in wishing for the liquidation of such a system and its replacement by another which will loyally comply with the Constitution and respect the rights of Portuguese citizens.

“He considers the present situation infinitely more dangerous than the previous one; the street disorders, the financial crisis, the political divisions and the backwardness of material development then were far less harmful to the moral and spiritual values of the country than the monstrous corruption existing in all sectors of the Administration now under the protection of the present institutions. The atmosphere of fear, by which the whole population is

sterilized by the threats of the secret police and the persecution conducted by the one (Salazar's) party, the disastrous orientation given to the problems of health and education, the spectacular "show business" air with which social problems are twisted, the outrageous misery of spiritual life (suffocated by subservience to leaders and mental exile), the persistent poison of propaganda which makes gods of despots and mediocrities, the despotism of the government; in other words, the colossal lie resulting from the absolute lack of conformity between what is said and what is done, between a constitution of artificially democratic rules and the legal sophistries of a government which exercises power personally and arbitrarily, for which that very same Constitution is irrelevant.

"The material achievements accomplished by fiscal extortion do not compensate the people for the coldly planned attempt all through the years against the character, rights and feelings of a whole population for the benefit of a minority.

"His present situation, as well as that of all Portuguese not affiliated to or protected by the only legal party, well illustrates the monstrous effects of that attempt. It is this way: He is unable to call the witnesses he would like to present because some would refuse fearing revenge for having shown themselves favorable to him; others he does not dare to call because doing so would expose them to persecution. He will possibly resort to the courage of a civilized counsel—one of those few whose moral formation still knows how to resist all threats and dangers—in order not to jeopardize the career of fellow officers to whom he could resort.

"Previous to the May 28th movement—to which situation he does not want to revert except if it is the only choice between the present regime and that one—the citizens never lost their political freedoms, corruption was never protected by imposed silence or the mystifications of propaganda, and men never prostituted their character for fear of responsibility or loss of bread as happens now."

The P.I.D.E. was giving Galvao rope with which to hang himself; a barrage of statements like this convinced the regime that he was anything but repentant and that there could never be any reconciliation between this former favorite and his masters.

Galvao and seven others were ordered to stand trial. Half the defendants were military men: Galvao, General of Brigade Antonio de Sousa Maia, Colonel Luis Gonzaga Tadeu, Lieutenant-Colonel Manuel Martind dos Reis; the civilians were Jose da Silva Tendeiro, Jose Antonio Fernandes, Chief of Police (the regular police, not the P.I.D.E.), Ilido Fernandes Correio, Inspector of the Ministry of labor, and Joao Soares de Sousa Machado, an employee of the Post Office.

A large number of men had been arrested originally but many were now released. Some of these, it is interesting to note, later appeared as witnesses for the defendants and swore that they had done just as much or as little as any of the defendants.

The regime's method of picking defendants does seem to have been somewhat arbitrary. Those put on trial were by no means the only people prominent in the affairs of the N.C.O., and some of those tried were not very important. But there was no doubt about one thing; the government was particularly interested in placing Henrique Galvao in prison.

The court was a military body assisted by a civilian judge who was there primarily to advise the court on technical legal matters. The other two judges were military men.

All of the men present—judges, prosecutors, police, lawyers and defendants—had been deeply involved in the affairs of the regime. One witness, a brigade general, had been tried only a few years before in a similar case and Galvao had acted as his defense counsel. There was high drama in this spectacle of old friends and associates defending and prosecuting one another, and the testimony was heavily larded with flowery rhetorical references to "old companions" and "close associates."

The prosecution based its case on three main points: it claimed that some notes found in Galvao's files were the blueprint of a contemplated revolution; it claimed that a meeting had been organized in the Ginasio movie house for the purpose of plotting the revolution; it claimed that there was another meeting in a private house near the Airport for the same purpose.

The trial was not a spectacular success for the government. Although the Chief Justice made an arduous attempt to keep testimony about the methods used by the P.I.D.E. to obtain "statements" out of the case, it kept popping up. Finally, the P.I.D.E. inspector in charge of the case was called by the counsel for one of the defendants. The inspector was a rather verbose individual who was highly critical of the work of the prosecution. At one point, he sufficiently annoyed the chief prosecuting attorney to the extent that he threatened to leave the court room.

But aside from the spectacle of dissension among the government officials in charge of the case that he provided, the presence of the inspector allowed the defense attorneys to raise the issue of the P.I.D.E.'s methods. The Inspector was asked to describe how he had interrogated Mr. Moreira de Campos, a Naval officer who had been arrested with the defendants, jailed for eight months and then released. The inspector insisted that the P.I.D.E. treated its prisoners as if they were honored guests in a luxury hotel.

Moreira de Campos was then called and told a different story. He said that the inspector had put drugs in his food, that he had been told that if he confessed he would be set free, and that if he didn't it might take longer, that the whole process of interrogation would begin all over again.

The court had known that it was in for some interesting testimony as soon as Moreira de Campos took the oath.

Conventionally, he was asked, "Do you swear, by God or by your honor and conscience, to tell the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?"

"I shall swear by my honor and conscience," said Moreira de Campos, "that what I will say is the truth and nothing but the truth, though not the whole truth."

The President of the Court then cut in sharply: "You must note that the oath has a fixed formula," he said. "It cannot be permitted to be changed. It is 'the whole truth' that you must say."

"I cannot say that I will tell 'the whole truth,'" Moreira de Campos replied, "because you would not allow the whole truth."

After a great deal of consultation the court settled for: "The truth and nothing but the truth."

Mr. Moreira de Campos had harsh words to say about the P.I.D.E. He declared: "I, myself, was coerced when I was under the P.I.D.E.'s arrest. Before I was going to be questioned I was 'prepared.' I arrived at such a state of depression that they were able to make me give in just by promising to let me go if I signed the confession. I consider myself fairly 'hard' but what they made me take just broke me."

De Campos said that at one point in the interrogation the Inspector told him, "The truth does not matter. What matters is what is signed. All prisoners have the right to lie."

The chief prosecution witness was Antonio Julio Feio Borges, a dope addict and a man who has spent much of his life in mental institutions. A chronic "conspirator," Borges testified that he became interested in revolution after the war when his personal finances (like those of many other Portuguese) suffered a sharp reverse. He thought a revolution might bring "better times." He also said that he hated the Government because the P.I.D.E. had once arrested and beaten his father.

According to Borges, one of the main centers of revolutionary activity was the Bijou Tea House on one of Lisbon's main boulevards. This was an interesting tidbit because while the Bijou is well-known as a place to exchange all kinds (including political) gossip, it seems like an oddly

public place to plot a revolution. Borges knew Galvao and ran errands for him and would bring back all the gossip from the Bijou.

The prosecutor at one point asked Galvao about a list of names that had been found in his files. Galvao replied:

"I used to record all of the information he (Borges) would bring—chiefly the names of the conspirators . . . I recorded yours, Mr. General President, that of His Excellency the General Promoter . . ." A wave of laughter swept the court and the prosecution went on to another, less embarrassing question.

Borges was certainly well-known to the P.I.D.E., but it is hard to think that they credited him with being a very dangerous revolutionary. Every time two government employees at the Bijou would lower their heads to exchange a particularly choice bit of gossip about a colleague's mistress, Borges dreamt up another plot and reported it to Galvao and anyone else who would listen. The P.I.D.E. must have expected that Borges would not make a very imposing appearance on the witness stand, but elected to use him anyway.

One solid fact that Borges' testimony uncovered had to do with the famous "notes" found in Galvao's personal files. Borges, after being arrested, shared a cell with Galvao. After a few days, Galvao asked Borges to go to his apartment when he was released and pick up certain papers which he didn't want in the hands of the P.I.D.E. The next day, Borges was released and although the full story never came out in court, Borges soon found himself in a psychiatric clinic and the P.I.D.E. wound up in possession of the papers which they had somehow overlooked when they first searched Galvao's files.

Borges implicated everybody in a series of involved plots to overthrow the government. When asked by one of the defense counsels. "If there was going to be a revolution, you were involved in it; why aren't you too under arrest?"

Borges' reply indicated his state of mind: "Maybe you're in it, too."

But a second lawyer, an old friend of Borges, had a far greater success with this witness. Under a barrage of skillful questions, Borges simply collapsed.

He was finally asked, "What do you know about the revolution prepared by the defendants?"

Borges answered, "Nothing."

The questioning went on in the tense court room. The lawyer built his climax carefully. Finally, he pointed to the defendants and exclaimed, "Then those men are innocent?"

Borges answered, "Completely innocent." Then he confessed that he had not said anything which the P.I.D.E. had reported as being his statement under questioning, and that at the time of this questioning he had been under treatment at the psychiatric clinic.

The lawyer was unprepared for so great a success. While he might have gone and obtained from Borges a rather fascinating account of the P.I.D.E.'s methods, he contented himself with obtaining from Borges a complete denial of his former charges.

Finally, the President of the Court interrupted, had Borges arrested for perjury, and recessed the court for ten minutes.

But Borges' spectacular collapse did not affect the government's case. The prosecutor plodded relentlessly on, in a stubborn attempt to convict the defendants. Though it was pointed out that practically all members of the court, on both sides of the case, had participated in at least one revolution (that of May 28th, 1926) the old revolutionaries were not prepared to countenance any further attempts of this sort.

It was also noted by the defense that a movie theatre was a rather impractical place to arrange a revolution; Galvao's counsel, Almeida Braga, asked Admiral Mendes Cabecadas, one of the Founders of the regime, a key question: "Sir, you are an old conspirator and you know how conspiracies are accomplished. . . . New ideologies must not have changed the techniques of conspiracy

very much. Do you believe that Captain Galvao, experienced and astute, as he is, would have promoted the much mentioned meeting at the Ginasio under the atmosphere of indiscretion and openness in which it took place?"

It was also noted by the defense that both meetings were observed by the P.I.D.E. who had operators trailing many of those who attended, but that it made no effort to break them up.

Despite all this, two of the defendants were convicted (six were found not guilty). One was Colonel Tadeu, and the other, to no one's surprise, was Henrique Galvao. Galvao was sentenced to 3 years in jail or 4 years detention in a special camp overseas for political prisoners.

But the irregularities in the government's case were so pronounced and created such a scandal that the conviction was reversed by Portugal's Supreme Court.

In March 1953, Galvao was retried. This time the government based its case almost solely on the "blueprints for revolution" found in Galvao's files.

Galvao was as defiant as ever. He claimed that the "blueprint" was merely the outline of a play he was writing. "I won't deny," he said, "that I myself and thousand of other Portuguese patriots are dissatisfied with the present regime and eager for political freedom, but dreaming is one thing and action is another."

Before the conviction was announced, Galvao was found to be trying to saw his way through the bars with a saw smuggled into his cell. Galvao was transferred to another prison.

Shortly after this, a series of pamphlets were released in Lisbon, denouncing Salazar and all his works. The P.I.D.E. thought the style sounded familiar; there was an investigation and the director of Galvao's prison was dismissed; his assistant committed suicide. Due out of prison in October, 1954, Galvao was arraigned instead on charges of "abuse of the press and insults."

Galvao refused to come out of jail to face another trial; in 1957 he was convicted of this offense after dis-

missing his defense counsel on the grounds that it would be impossible for him to obtain a fair trial.

He languished in prison until 1959, although it is rumored that he played a prominent role in planning Delgado's run for the presidency.

Early in 1959, Galvao seemed to be on his last legs. He succeeded in convincing the prison authorities that he was dying. With Delgado's assistance he was transferred from the prison to a military hospital in Lisbon.

One day a nurse noticed a heavily veiled woman coming out of Henrique Galvao's room. Several hours later she remarked to a doctor: "Poor Galvao must be dying. I didn't even know he could have visitors, but I saw his wife coming out of his room a little while ago."

The doctor was startled. "He's not that badly off," he replied. "I'm sure he's not supposed to have visitors, unless . . ." the doctor raced to Galvao's room. The bed was empty. Galvao was free at last.

Several days later a guard opened the front door of the Argentine Embassy to receive a small, middle-aged workman carrying a cask of port that was evidently much too heavy for him.

"I'm sorry you'll have to go around to the back with that," the guard said.

The workman dropped the cask. "No, I won't," the man said. "I am Henrique Galvao and I ask for political asylum."

Galvao got it. After protracted negotiations he was allowed to fly to Buenos Aires. When General Delgado reached Rio, Galvao made an application for a visa to that country. It was refused.

Galvao moved to Venezuela where he met Delgado and others prominent in the opposition. There they plotted and schemed for a method which would permit them to overthrow Salazar. Galvao tried to draw attention to their plight by writing articles. One of these appeared in the *Nation* on January 9, 1960. In it, Galvao tried to tell the American public what he considered wrong with the state of affairs in Portugal.

Galvao starts off by comparing Salazar to certain other

20th century politicians. "Salazar's role in Portugal," he writes, "is essentially no different from the patterns of twentieth-century dictatorships established by Mussolini, continued by Primo de Rivera (Spanish dictator of the 20's) and Hitler, and still surviving in the Iberian Peninsula and in three nations of Latin America (not to mention the communist bloc). It is Portuguese only in that its dictator was born in Portugal. Salazar's totalitarian oligarchy occupies the country by force, just like a foreign invader. One sees the same cult of personality, the same idea of personal power, with the people reduced to the status of animals, a herd bereft of will."

Salazar differs from the other dictators, Galvao says, only in that his reputation is better. "Salazar," he writes, "has managed for many years to appear as a different sort of dictator, ruling an acceptable tyranny. In this he has evidently been favored by the fact that Portugal is less important to world politics than Italy, Germany or even Spain, and by the lack of principles of the great democracies. . . ."

"It is his talent for fraud which alone distinguishes Salazar from other dictators and gives his own dictatorship a different appearance. He has always been a constant and clever liar."

Galvao claims that though it is easy to find out the truth about what happens in Portugal few have taken the trouble to try. "Yet actually few foreigners have taken an interest in the Portuguese situation, which is of small importance in the *mare magnum* of the political problems of a world in turmoil. Governments and leading parties in the great Western democracies look upon the human and universal aspects of democratic principles from vantage points much too dehumanized to allow for any interest in the sufferings of a people not American, English or French, and lacking in oil riches or international influence. And the ordinary people of the world, as well as the intellectuals and artists, absorbed in the great stage of world affairs, only hear and read, on the radio and in the press, what Salazar's propaganda says;

they remain completely unaware of what his propaganda costs those who pay for it in Portugal.

“Under all these conditions, Salazar’s old and proven ability to lie has led to an easy and prolonged success. It has apparently transformed him into a dictator different from the rest—the caretaker and shepherd of the Portuguese people . . .

“And it is in the image of the shepherd, a firm but kind leader, which has been circulating like counterfeit money in circles of Western opinion beyond the Pyrenean Curtain.”

Some of Galvao’s antagonism to Salazar seems to stem from the Portuguese Prime Minister’s rather drab personality. Thus Galvao writes: “While other dictatorships—Fascist, Nazi, Russian and Spanish—were foisted upon their respective nations as the catastrophic consequences of profound political and social crises, originating or terminating in a war, the Portuguese dictatorship, provisionally established by the military, was the result of nothing more than a crisis of order and administration brought about by the difficulties of a nascent republic. And while the Italian, German, Russian and Spanish dictatorships were established at the great personal risk of their authors, Portugal’s dictator, lacking in active political background, the obscure member of a Catholic party, prudently assumed the powers of an already established dictatorship without any personal risk whatever, abusing the trust the nation had placed in him as a financial expert. Where most other dictators took power through brute force, Salazar used fraud.”

Galvao then goes on to complain of the same abuses he told the court of during his trial. He says that while these abuses are obvious to anyone who knows the facts, Salazar has succeeded in building up an image in the outside world behind which he hides the corruption of the regime. He writes:

“Thus he built up the image of a humble, modest person, one who eschewed worldly glory and ambition—a mask which seemed to make his regime one of peace

and order (of the kind, one notes, that are found in cemeteries). And so, for the single party whose leader he became, he appeared as a sort of medieval saint; for the heterodox of his faith, a tyrant in the service of God; zoologically, a rare, peculiar species of carnivorous lamb; in the propagandistic projection of his figure, a wise man and a philosopher turning his genius toward politics.

“But behind the facade built up for the world, there remained the effective reality of a dictator like the others, basically more dangerous because he was better disguised.”

During the war Galvao charges, Salazar first swung toward the Axis, then away when it became evident that they were losing the war. After the war, Galvao says, Salazar embarked on a massive propaganda campaign to convince the Western world that all was in order in Portugal.

But, claims Galvao, the elections of 1958 (in which Delgado was the opposition's candidate) upset his plans. Galvao writes:

“The Presidential elections of 1958 brought to light a decisive phase in the decomposition of the regime. Neither brute force, nor threats, nor jails filled with political prisoners, nor the mobilization of the army could prevent a mass manifestation of the people which revealed how illusory the mask of the dictator was.

“In spite of the fact that they were unarmed, that they were almost everywhere watched by the political police, that the democratic parties were disorganized and fiercely persecuted, the people of the provinces and overseas possessions—cities and villages, youth, Catholics, the Church itself, which for so many years had supported the dictator—all showed by every means possible and some considered impossible that they could no longer bear the dictator and his regime. The candidate of the democratic opposition (not Communist) was elected overwhelmingly.”

After claiming that Delgado had actually won the election, Galvao concluded by making a series of charges

against the regime. The regime, after 30 years of power, had achieved the following results, Galvao said:

“Administrative corruption which taxes the imagination. (In Angola and Mozambique, Portuguese colonies which I came to know well in my former position as Chief Inspector of Overseas Territories, 70 percent of the administrative officials spend more than they officially earn.)

“Forced labor in the Portuguese provinces is today indistinguishable from outright slavery.

“Of the Portuguese budget, 32 percent is spent on the military and less than 6 percent on health.

“The Portuguese diet is among the most meager in Europe; 20 percent of the population suffers from malnutrition.

“Portugal has one physician for every 1400 inhabitants. In contrast, no country in Europe has more drug stores in proportion to population. The government has built more stadiums than hospitals (although Portugal is a country without athletes). The country’s death rate from tuberculosis—44 per thousand in 1958—is more than twice that of any country in Western Europe.

“The complete sterilization of intellectual life.”

But these and other articles of Galvao, created little comment in the outer world. As we have seen, Galvao complains at length of the indifference of the rest of the world to conditions in Portugal. Both he and Delgado have a decided flare for the dramatic. They decided to focus the eyes of the world on their struggle with one dramatic stroke.

There was one final obstacle to clear. The P.I.D.E. had been watching Galvao closely since he left Portugal. He could do nothing until they were thrown off the track. Once again he feigned sickness; doctors hurried in and out of his house at all hours of the day and night; Galvao stayed in bed for months. Finally, the P.I.D.E. reported back to Lisbon that they might as well forget about Henrique Galvao. This time he was surely going to die.

They had spoken too soon. After learning that the P.I.D.É. no longer considered him worthy of observation, Delgado and Galvao started making their plans to seize the *Santa Maria*.

Chapter 5

THE CHASE

CHAPTER FIVE

THE CHASE

THE first indication the world had that anything was wrong on the *Santa Maria* came in a message to H. O. Shaw, president of Shaw Brothers, Limited, the ship's agents in Miami, saying that the *Santa Maria* was having "engine difficulty" and would therefore be unable to reach Miami on schedule. The message came at 5 P.M., January 23, 1961.

It caused no particular alarm. Ships do experience "engine difficulty" at regular intervals. There were no storms in the Caribbean; there was no reason for Shaw Brothers to worry about the safety of their ship.

But slightly later the same day, the *Santa Maria* hove to off the island of St. Lucia and lowered a boat. In the boat were several of the crew who had been wounded when Galvao had taken over the ship, plus other members of the crew whom he apparently did not care to have along on his voyage. They rowed their lifeboat laboriously into the harbor of Castries while the *Santa Maria* sailed off at full speed.

A small crowd gathered as the lifeboat pulled into shore.

They saw the wounded men lying in the bottom of the boat. One of the officers leaped ashore and started to jabber in Portuguese; no one understood, *Santa Lucia* being an English possession. Others of the crew shouted "Pirates! We are abandoned by pirates." The crowd wondered whether this were not part of some elaborate practical joke, perhaps some kind of stunt arranged by the cruise director to amuse the jaded passengers. The crew continued to yell excitedly, the *Santa Maria* soon became a speck on the horizon, and gradually the crowd on the dock began to understand what these excited Portuguese were hollering about. But they still could hardly believe their ears.

The *Santa Maria*, when she left St. Lucia, had 1568 tons of oil on board, enough to take her 5000 miles in any direction. She had food sufficient for 20 days. She could go anywhere in the Western Hemisphere in that time, and no one, except perhaps General Delgado and Henrique Galvao, was sure of her ultimate destination.

Soon radios around the world were crackling with the incredible message—"piracy on the high seas." In the area where Blackbeard and Long Ben had roamed, another pirate(?) had seized another ship. What his purposes were nobody knew.

A TTT radio message—code for urgent—went out from Barbados to all ships in the area to watch for the *Santa Maria* and report on her whereabouts if sighted.

From St. Lucia itself, the HMS *Rothesay*, a frigate, designed for anti-submarine duty, making 40 knots, went out on the trail of the *Santa Maria* with one of the Portuguese crewmen on board.

The U.S. destroyers *Wilson* and *Damato* left from Puerto Rico in search of the missing vessel. The Navy said: "We're sending two aircraft to search out the ship and drop flares. We're sending two destroyers from Puerto Rico to intercept the vessel under the well-defined terms of international law governing piracy and insurrection aboard ship."

The word was piracy in the early days of the search. The Portuguese Government labeled Galvao's action "a

preposterous crime" and asked help from all her NATO allies under the terms of international law regarding piracy. The *Compania Colonial De Navagacao* of Lisbon, which owned the *Santa Maria* and her sister ship the *Vera Cruz*, said the seizure was "pure piracy." For the moment, the American and English governments accepted this version of the incident.

But already Galvao was acting to force world opinion to recognize his action as political in nature, part of an insurrection against the government of Antonio de Oliveira Salazar. On January 24, he radioed a message from "the occupation forces of the ship *Santa Maria* to all the newspapers of the free world." He was speaking, he said, in the name of "the international junta of liberals presided over by General Humberto Delgado, president-elect of the Portuguese Republic, fraudulently deprived of his rights by the Salazar government."

In addition, Galvao got in touch with Delgado, radioing: "I rush to take over the forces under my command as the first step in liberating the national territory."

Galvao also sought to assure the world that the passengers were safe. "All is normal on board," he said. "We will inform the world in due time."

Meanwhile the world speculated as to what Galvao would do now that he had a ship. Some, remembering his experience in Africa, thought that he would head in that direction. Others thought that he would seek refuge in Brazil. There were reports that the *Santa Maria* was headed for Cuba where Galvao was reportedly going to raise an army and then sail for Portugal.

Since Brazil has a large Portuguese colony, and since General Delgado resided there, many were wondering what the reaction of the Brazilian government to Galvao's action would be. At first it was decidedly hostile. Navy Minister Jorge Matoso Maia said that the men who seized the *Santa Maria* would be interned and the ship handed back to Portugal if they put in at a Brazilian port. Spokesmen for the Foreign Ministry said that it was doubtful that political asylum could be granted since Galvao and his men were accused of murder, piracy

and theft. But this was not the last word from Brazil. A new president, Janio Quadros, was to be inaugurated in less than a week and many thought this would make a decisive difference in Brazil's attitude toward the Portuguese "rebels."

The next day, Tuesday, January 24, the Caribbean was alive with boats and planes, ceaselessly criss-crossing these tropical sea lanes, all searching for the *Santa Maria*. The search was concentrated in the Lesser Antilles, above and below St. Lucia along the Windwash islands. The last anyone had seen of the *Santa Maria* had been over 24 hours ago in the strait between St. Lucia and Martinique.

Using Barbados as a base the Navy sent out four Hurricane Hunters, three P2V Neptunes and two Albatross amphibians on countless sorties. Venezuelan planes joined in the search, and Brazil offered her assistance in locating the missing ship. British ships and planes were already out in force.

As top-ranking Naval officers paced the floor, these planes and ships performed an established search pattern which the Navy knew would eventually locate the *Santa Maria*. The question was when? Reports had come from St. Lucia that the crew members had heard Galvao threaten to scuttle the ship if he were intercepted. The lives of the 600 passengers aboard might well be in danger at that very moment. Time after time, planes located blips on their radar screens which corresponded to those which a ship the size of the *Santa Maria* might make, but then they went to check them out they found that they had been caused by spume from the high seas running that day; all blips were checked out with negative results. The ships were also hampered by the high seas and low visibility. By nightfall there was still no sign of the *Santa Maria*.

She was, however, behaving strangely for a ship which sought to avoid detection. Earlier in the day she had opened communication with the RCA radio station at Chatham, Mass. Galvao sent out two long messages, one to General Delgado and another to the world press, stating his purpose in seizing the *Santa Maria*. If the Navy

had known the *Santa Maria* was on the air, it would have been a relatively simple matter to establish her position by means of a triangulation "fix" or her radio. But the Navy had missed these first messages; now they were notified by the newspapers of what had taken place and set radio operators listening on the correct wave length for the next message from the *Santa Maria*.

Galvao's messages (in telegraphese) deserve to be quoted here, since they are the first links in a chain of events which altered the status of his ship in the eyes of the U.S. and other governments around the world.

He radioed Delgado:

"Mission integrally accomplished after briefest combat, occupation. All our companions acted serene bravery worthy of praise. I confirm the communication and at same time I give it to free world press that from all world asks information.

As it was and will be, Salazar's newspaper insult and calumny. Crew accepted consumed fact and maintains itself disciplined, majority passengers enthusiastically with us.

Aboard there absolute tranquility, safety in perfectly normal life. All are well, asking their health be communicated families. I beg obtain, as rightful, recognition of insurrectional act and consequently state of belligerence, through hearing of specialists international law. We follow our secret destiny and we hail in Your Excellency, Chief of State, elected by people. I shall communicate whenever possible without prejudice of secrecy of destination and operational plans. In no event shall we surrender.

I beg to make known to our families and Portuguese people, whom your Excellency represents, that we are well and we salute you. Everything established according to powers conferred me by Your Excellency and National Independent Liberation Junta as the political, military, administrative organ of National Independence Movement. We shall land passengers in first neutral port that assures us this possibility without internment of ship.

Our desire is ever so much greater since all are showing themselves in sympathy and understanding, including foreigners.

We salute people, press, President-elect Brazil, very sensitive their support of our cause. For Motherland, for Liberty!

HENRIQUE GALVAO"

To the world press, Galvao sent the following message:

"First official communique to all democratic newspapers of the free world from the command of the forces occupying the S.S. Santa Maria in the name of the National Independent Junta of Liberation led by General Humberto Delgado, legally elected President of the Portuguese Republic, who has been fraudulently deprived of his rights by the Salazar Administration:

After a brief combat at about 1:45 A.M. I captured and occupied the S.S. Santa Maria with the forces under my command, the first free group from the national territory. The crew accepted the act as a political one in accordance with international maritime law, and the majority of the passengers welcomed the action enthusiastically. There is complete calm and safety on board, services are being furnished as normally as on an ordinary voyage. Best relations with the occupying forces. I give you this on my word of honor. Passengers and crew request their families be informed that they are well, and I add that they are well and free. We cannot reveal our destination without open hostilities against the tyrannical government of Salazar. We shall try to reach it. (Our) political objectives purely democratic, therefore purely anti-totalitarian, against all forms of tyrannical governments (and) peoples.

We ask not only the support of all truly free governments and peoples but also political recognition of this party liberated from the national territory, led by General Delgado whom the Portuguese people elected chief in a legal election.

In executing our action, we did not have the slightest

political or material aid from any foreign government, only the sacrifice and patriotic devotion of the occupying forces under my command and the base personnel. None of us and none of those who came over to our side of their own free will is willing to surrender.

We shall put the passengers ashore in complete safety and as quickly as possible at the first neutral port that assures non-internment of the ship.

We salute the Portuguese people and other oppressed people of the Peninsula with many thanks for their behavior and understanding of the circumstances, and invite them to join the democratic uprising which will follow us. We salute the Brazilian people and press for their constant support of our cause. The occupying forces are well and ask the press of the world to greet their families in their names.

HENRIQUE GALVAO"

Cutting through the rethoric, we can see that Galvao was anxious to establish three crucial points in these messages: (1) that what happened on board the *Santa Maria* was part of an insurrection—not an act of piracy; (2) that the passengers were well and being treated courteously; (3) that he desired the good will of the countries of the world, but particularly that of Brazil and her new President, Janio Quadros.

But the fact that Galvao had sent out these extended messages, knowing—as he must have—that the Navy could determine his position by getting a fix on the ship's radio, showed that he was more anxious to publicize himself and his purposes than he was to use the *Santa Maria* for a direct military operation, at least for the time being. For even if the U.S. and Britian did not interfere, Galvao knew that even the limited Portuguese Navy was capable of sinking the unarmed *Santa Maria* if it were used against Portuguese territory. His only hope, if this was what he was trying to accomplish, would be to sneak by the Portuguese ships, and in order to do this he surely would have maintained radio silence.

The question of whether or not Galvao could be

treated as a pirate was crucial. If he were a pirate then it was the plain duty of all ships at sea to stop him and return the *Santa Maria* to her rightful owners. At first, it seemed that this was the case. Galvao was in possession of a ship that did not belong to him—therefore, he must be a pirate. But it was not quite that simple.

According to Hackworth's "Digest of International Law": "Piracy consists in sailing the seas for private ends without authorization from the government or any state with the object of committing depredations upon property or acts of violence against persons."

A pirate, according to Hackworth, is "a sea robber, pillaging by force of arms, stealing or destroying."

"Oppenheim's International Law," a standard reference work in the field, says that piracy can be the action of one or more persons conspiring to seize a ship for plunder or other purposes.

The question then, was whether Galvao had taken the *Santa Maria* "for private ends," to pillage, destroy and rob, or whether this was part of a revolt against the Salazar regime. If it were, then Galvao was very possibly not a pirate and using the U.S. or British Navies to recapture the *Santa Maria* might represent interference in Portuguese internal affairs.

To the Salazar regime, at least, it was all perfectly clear. A spokesman in Lisbon declared: "The men who attacked the *Santa Maria* are not politicians or ideologists. They are just outlaws."

The regime doubted, the spokesman continued, whether the opposition to Salazar in Portugal had had anything to do with "the wicked act committed by this gang of pirates." The opposition, he stressed, "must not in any way be mistaken for these adventurers.

"The conscience of the civilized world cannot fail to reproach with indignation this return to the barbarian practices that made the Caribbean Sea an area of dishonor which took centuries to clean up," he concluded.

Other sources in Lisbon played variations on this theme. The pro-Government newspaper *Diario de Manha* editorialized: "The crime has been committed against the

moral and judicial rules of the civilized world and cannot be left unpunished."

Galvao's action, it said, "shows the capability of criminals who publish pamphlets showing Communist intentions and arms at the disintegration of the people and lands of Portugal."

Other Portuguese officials described Galvao's action as the "Act of a madman." If the U.S. captured Galvao, they said, "They can gladly try him for piracy. We don't want him back here."

The United States Government was at first disposed to accept the official Portuguese view of the matter. Lincoln White, a spokesman for the State Department, told the press: "The Government of Portugal has asked certain countries, including the United States, to provide assistance in locating and intercepting the *Santa Maria*. The United States is acceding to this request. As a United States Navy spokesman stated last night, destroyers and airplanes have been dispatched 'to intercept the vessel under the well-defined terms of international law governing piracy and insurrection aboard ship'."

When asked if Galvao's men might be granted asylum as political exiles if the *Santa Maria* were recovered, Mr. White replied, "That seems a little far-fetched."

On the same day a Naval spokesman at the Pentagon reiterated: "The Navy will take such measures as are necessary and appropriate to reinstate the control of the ship by constituted Portuguese authorities."

The British Government was also disposed to accept the Salazar regime's explanation of the incident aboard the *Santa Maria*. In a lively debate in the House of Commons, C.I. Orr-Ewing, Civil Lord of the Admiralty, speaking for the government said that the Admiralty would honor Portugal's request and restore "the vessel and her cargo to her rightful owners," though at the same time admitting that the facts concerning the seizure of the ship were "not clear."

"I am advised that the Governments are fully entitled, in accordance with International Law, to take this action and meet this request," he declared.

When questioned by the opposition as to the political aspects of the case, he replied that it was not for the Government to judge "the politics of the government we are trying to assist." He went on to cite "the normal tradition of the Royal Navy, that when asked for assistance you should provide assistance. We have done exactly that."

General Delgado saw the danger to Galvao if he were treated as a pirate by the U.S. and British governments. He sent telegrams to the United States Ambassador, John Moors Cabot, and the British Ambassador, Sir Geoffrey Wallinger, in Rio, saying: "I request you to inform immediately your Government that the *Santa Maria* case does not represent mutiny or piracy but appropriation of Portuguese transport by Portuguese for Portuguese political objectives. I beg insistently that your government not interfere in the subject."

General Delgado acknowledged to the press that he knew of the plans to take over the *Santa Maria* and added, "There are clandestine movements in all Portuguese territories."

He said that he had delegated to Galvao the power to actually carry out the coup.

He also denied that the *Santa Maria* might be heading for Cuba. "We did not take the ship only to be exiled again," he said. "Why Cuba? There is no reason for Cuba."

And in London a group calling itself Portuguese Democrats in Britain appealed to the English and American governments not to interfere. They issued a statement saying, "The seizure of the *Santa Maria* is the latest protest against a Fascist regime in Portugal under which no free dissent has been possible for thirty-five years."

While the diplomats dickered about the exact status of the *Santa Maria* under international law, a stream of messages continued to pour from the ship's radio; most of them were directed to the families of the passengers, assuring them that all was well.

"We're safe; don't worry," wired Mr. and Mrs. Delbert Smith, Jr.

"Safe. Well." radioed Mr. and Mrs. Henry Bates.

"We are OK," said Prof. and Mrs. John W. Bietz.

"Everything is all right," Mrs. Joan Densmore Harber-son sent to her father.

"Destination unknown. Love. Mother," was the mes-
sage from Mrs. Caroline Boyce to her son.

Once again it seemed Galvao was placing public opinion ahead of the security of the *Santa Maria*. He was more anxious to reassure the world that he and his men were honorable revolutionists who intended no harm to neutral parties than he was to escape detection.

The Navy this time was on the alert. Late on the afternoon of January 25, they announced from San Juan, Puerto Rico that they had obtained a "fix" on the *Santa Maria's* position about 400 miles east of the island of Guadolope in the Caribbean.

The "fix" was confirmed when the captain of the Danish freighter *Viveke Gulwa* radioed that he had sighted a ship having the "characteristics" of the *Santa Maria* at 12 degrees 18 minutes north latitude and 52 degrees 12 minutes west longitude, making about 19 knots, on an approximate course of 105 degrees true.

The Navy was relieved to say the least. All through the day the officials in charge of the search had been worried. They had only two destroyers and 14 planes to cover an immense body of water. "We can't open the doors to Soviet surveillance of our costal areas just to join in the chase of the *Santa Maria*", a spokesman said.

Each Navy search pilot had had to cover almost 600 miles of search area. In that range they could expect to find 75 to 100 ships the size of the *Santa Maria*, and countless smaller vessels.

And to obtain a reliable radio "fix" it is necessary to hear a steady stream of messages.

The conclusion is inescapable that if Captain Galvao had really wished to avoid any kind of detection, he would have had a better than fair chance if he had maintained radio silence and changed his course.

But now the Navy was fairly certain that it had caught up with Galvao's *Santa Maria*. It sent the nearest search

plane, Lieutenant Daniel L. Krauss' Neptune P2V, winging at its top speed of 150 knots to the area where the *Santa Maria* was believed to be cruising.

It was raining and it had almost turned dark when Lieutenant Krauss spotted a ship on the horizon. Slowly he took the big patrol plane down to 800-1,000 feet and circled over the ship which was about 900 miles east of Trinidad and traveling at about 15 knots. He saw a crowd of about fifty passengers at the ship's stern and they waved at him hopefully. He looked down and saw the name *Santa Maria* painted on the ship's bow. He had found the needle in the haystack.

Lieutenant Krauss then flashed a blinker signal at the ship and asked how he could make contact with the ship's radio. The ship blinked back that the radio was presently on 2182 kilocycles.

After circling the liner for about 90 minutes Krauss made voice contact with the *Santa Maria*. Krauss says he had the impression that Captain Galvao was standing by the radio operator all this time, for he continually heard a conversation in poor English being conducted in the background.

First Krauss asked whether everything was all right on the ship. The *Santa Maria's* radio operator assured him that everything was.

Then Krauss said that he had been instructed by his superiors to ask the ship to turn back to the nearest United States port.

The reply was short and defiant. "I will not go back," Galvao radioed. "My crew is not a pirate crew."

Krauss then asked where the *Santa Maria* was heading. The reply was definite (but as later events proved, somewhat misleading): "Destination Angola."

Krauss continued to circle the *Santa Maria* while he asked for information concerning the passengers. He then radioed his base at San Juan: "All well aboard. Destination Angola. Captain Galvao refused return San Juan. Will accept conference on board *Santa Maria* with U.S. or any authorities other than Portuguese or Spanish. Wishes to discharge passengers unharmed earliest."

Krauss was requested to trail the *Santa Maria* until he could be relieved by another patrol plane. The Navy, having caught up with the wandering liner was taking no chances on letting her out of the bag. It set up a relay relief system of seven planes to keep the *Santa Maria* under constant surveillance.

Galvao sent further assurances of the passengers' welfare in a cable to the *New York Times* which read: "Passengers are perfectly well physically and morally, and perfectly understand the sacrifices which we have had to ask them to undergo for the sake of freedom of my country. Their relations with the occupying forces are most cordial. Life aboard ship is perfectly normal.

"They will soon give unsolicited testimony of the attentive and humane treatment they have received."

General Delgado was somewhat more blunt when asked about the passengers. "War is war," he said, "and this is war on Portuguese territory. It is truly Portuguese business."

After locating the *Santa Maria* the Navy decided to make some kind of ship-to-ship contact and ordered the destroyers *Gearing* and *Vogelgesang*, which had been making a good-will tour of West African ports, and the atomic submarine *Sea Wolf* to trail her.

But the Navy's intentions with regard to Galvao were no longer quite what they had been the day before. Neither the State Department nor the Navy was entirely convinced that Galvao's action was piracy.

Lincoln White, the State Department spokesman, issued a new statement which marked a decided change in the American position: "The facts concerning the seizure of the *Santa Maria* are not entirely clear. Information available to the department is conflicting and not sufficiently detailed to form a basis of firm opinion as to whether the crime of piracy under international law has been committed.

"There are grounds for suspicion of piracy. This, together with the request of the Portuguese Government for assistance, are considered to afford ample basis for the action now being taken by United States naval authorities

to ascertain the whereabouts of this vessel and to make appropriate investigation."

In other words, the United States government was no longer willing to undertake to retrieve the ship by force of arms from Captain Galvao and hand it back to the Portuguese government. They were, naturally, concerned about the 36 Americans aboard, and they did not want to offend the Salazar regime, so they were quite willing to find the *Santa Maria* and keep on eye on her. But further than that they were unwilling to go. There was no longer any talk at either the State Department or the Pentagon of firing a shot across the *Santa Maria's* bow and sending out a boarding party, and there was not to be any until the affair had been concluded.

At the same time the British Government announced that it had no further interest in the case. The frigate, *HMS Rothesay*, the first ship to join in the chase had returned to Barbados and would not participate in tracking the *Santa Maria*.

Since Galvao in his first conversations with Lieutenant Krauss had mentioned that he was eager to discharge his passengers at a neutral port, many speculated that he might well have Brazil in mind. Incoming President Quadros was reportedly friendly to Galvao and Delgado. But the attitude of outgoing President Kubitschek's administration was not quite so positive. The situation was anything but clear.

The Brazilian government announced that, "all details concerning the Portuguese ship *Santa Maria* are the object of studies by political and juridical services of the Foreign Ministry." Though this was not a very definite statement, it was significant that it avoided stating definitely that the ship would be confiscated and returned to the Portuguese if it landed.

Brazilian public opinion seemed to favor Galvao. An editorial in *O Estado de Sao Paulo* commented: "We do not have the least doubt that Latin American public opinion . . . condemns this gesture of collaboration by two democracies (Britain and the United States) with

one of the most disreputable and anachronistic dictatorships in the world."

And Alvaro Lins, who as Ambassador to Portugal had given Delgado sanctuary in Lisbon when he needed it, stated: "I disagree with those who call Galvao's act piracy. It is a legitimate act of revolution. The movement led by Captain Galvao is an act of patriotism by a real hero."

With the possibility of a landing in Brazil firmly in mind, the U.S. Navy set out to persuade Galvao to come into port and let the passengers out of a potentially dangerous situation. They had been alarmed by two messages, one from Galvao, one from the passengers, which stated that while everything was "all right," food and water were being rationed and that medical services were "adequate." (The mere mention of medical services prompted speculation that some of the passengers had been hurt in the struggle for control of the ship on Monday.)

But even more troublesome was Galvao's attitude. After thinking things over for a few hours he decided that he had been insulted by the Navy's earlier request that he return to San Juan and, in a message to the National Broadcasting Company, he dismissed the Navy's suggestion as "an impertinence and an offense."

"We are Portuguese politicians in a Portuguese ship, fighting for the liberty of our homeland. We are not and will not be confused with pirates," he explained.

And in the same defiant mood he had radioed to Brazil, "We consider the ship the first liberated piece of Portuguese territory. We will never surrender or stop in face of all the fleets of the world."

The Navy in its next messages tried to correct the impression that it had been "ordering" Galvao to do anything. The top brass had no desire to pussyfoot but it realized that as long as Galvao controlled the ship, he also controlled the passengers amongst whom were U.S. citizens. While the Navy could easily gun down the *Santa Maria*, it could not do so without endangering the

lives of the very people it was most concerned about protecting.

Admiral Robert Lee Dennison, commander of the Atlantic Fleet, sent the following to Galvao: "Request you proceed any port northern South America you choose to discharge passengers. Please advise port selected and time of arrival. Will attempt to arrange conference aboard *Santa Maria* as you request."

A second message, from Rear Admiral Allen Smith, commander of the Caribbean Sea Frontier, addressed personally to Captain Galvao, read: "I note you intend to land passengers in a neutral country as soon as possible. I am concerned about safety of passengers and am anxious to arrange their safe debarkation soonest. What are your plans for landing passengers?"

But even as these messages went out a plea from the American passengers on board the *Santa Maria* increased the Navy's alarm. Their message read: "The majority of American citizens aboard request rendezvous U. S. Fleet. Captain Galvao says he is receptive to negotiate for disembarkation at sea of passengers onto U. S. vessels."

The Navy was genuinely concerned. They knew that three Portuguese warships were out in the Atlantic, and presumably they were hunting for the *Santa Maria*. One of them, the *Pedro Escobar*, was a fast frigate which just might catch the *Santa Maria* and whose three-inch guns were more than capable of blowing her out of the water. The message from the American passengers showed that they too were becoming more worried about conditions aboard the *Santa Maria*. It was reasonable for them to suppose that Captain Galvao would not hesitate to use the passengers as a shield between his men and hostile ships, but whether or not Salazar's men-of-war would fire was something no one could predict.

But Galvao was now in a conciliatory mood. He radioed the Navy:

"We accept protection escort American Navy against action of Portuguese warships until landing port.

"Will land passengers near South American or West African port giving preference Africa with all guarantees

as political insurgents that is, without losing our ship or action against crew or forces under dreadful dictatorship with the right to carry on our political defense Portuguese people freedom without further protection after landing passengers.

“Meeting aboard ship or landing port. We are very interested to show the work our respect for life nor forgetting your rights to protect American citizens. We beg your early reply. We have permitted all crew and passengers to have cables sent to families but we are having difficulties sending messages to you because radio officers are overworked. For freedom and democracy best wishes.”

Now this is not exactly what the Navy had asked for or promised. There had been no mention in either of the Admiral's messages of “protecting” Galvao's ship from the Portuguese Navy. Nevertheless, the Pentagon was not prepared to quibble.

Though the text of their reply to Galvao was kept secret at Galvao's request, a spokesman said that Admiral Dennison had radioed to the *Santa Maria* that “he would take no action to interfere with the *Santa Maria's* entering and departing a port or lying off a port for the purpose of discharging passengers.”

He also repeated that the Navy was eager to meet Captain Galvao on the *Santa Maria* to negotiate about a port for the landings.

The Admiral again expressed his concern for the welfare of the passengers and told Galvao that in his opinion “their well-being requires that they be disembarked as soon as possible.”

Admiral Dennison said that the Navy's decision not to take hostile action against the *Santa Maria* had been prompted by its responsibility to protect the lives and property of the U. S. citizens aboard as well as a “humanitarian concern for all the passengers.”

While the Admiral communicated with Galvao, the Navy took steps to see that he did not change his mind. The destroyers *Wilson* and *Damato* continued their pursuit, and now they were passed by the atomic submarine *Sea Wolf* which became the closest of the shadowing

vessels, some 800 miles away. And from the other side of the Atlantic the *Gearing* and *Vogelgesang* raced across the ocean to intercept the *Santa Maria*.

Then came word from the Navy planes which had been circling the *Santa Maria* constantly since Lieutenant Krauss had first sighted her; it was what the Navy had been longing to hear. The *Santa Maria* had changed course. She was now headed toward Brazil.

In Brazil, General Delgado took steps to bolster Galvao's position under international law. Stepping into a room filled with wildly cheering Portuguese exiles who had come to volunteer their services in the fight against the Salazar regime, he named Captain Galvao as "delegate plenipotentiary" for revolutionary action against the Portuguese regime, and ordered him to set up "an Independent Junta of Liberation" aboard the *Santa Maria*.

Then General Delgado went on to make a plea to all governments "to give, directly or indirectly, major help, moral and material, with the objective of liberating the Portuguese nation from slavery imposed by a totalitarian government."

He ordered Captain Galvao to enlist the aid of all possible "organs" in Portugal or the Portuguese colonies in order to prepare for "operations of liberation, occupation administration and public order."

Delgado concluded by remarking that the rallying of Portuguese to the rebel cause must be done within the spirit of the national independence movement; he was referring to the constant charges made by the Salazar regime that Galvao's group were Castro and Communist inspired. Delgado wished to make it clear that this was a Portuguese movement.

On Saturday, January 28, Navy Commander William Webster, in one of the Neptunes circling the *Santa Maria*, held a dramatic plane-to-ship conversation with Galvao. Galvao repeated that he was willing to negotiate with the United States about landing the passengers and for the first time sounded a new and promising note. He was willing, he said, if the proper guarantees were made, to bring the *Santa Maria* into "any selected Brazilian port."

Galvao also said that he would, in the meantime, circle the equator at a point of 35 degrees west longitude while negotiations were being completed.

When Commander Webster returned to Recife, Brazil (where the Navy's spotting planes were now based) with this offer, the Pentagon responded immediately. Admiral Smith was ordered to fly from naval headquarters at San Juan to Belem, Brazil, "to be available to meet the Santa Maria if the ship decides to confer with the Navy."

Everything now depended on Brazil's attitude toward Galvao's insurrection. And everything was complicated by the fact that the inauguration of Brazil's recently elected President Quadros was still three days in the future. Quadros was reported to be considerably more friendly toward Galvao and Delgado than his predecessor, President Kubitschek. On the other hand, Brazil was known to have a treaty of alliance with Portugal; no matter what President Quadros' personal feelings were, this treaty and Brazilian law would limit his actions.

Galvao was demanding that his ship be permitted to land its passengers, refuel and then head out to sea again. If Brazil would not guarantee that he could do this, he could easily change his course again and head for Africa. There he was virtually certain of a friendly reception at the hands of one of the new African nations who were fundamentally opposed to Salazar because of his colonial policies.

As Admiral Smith started winging his way south everything was far from settled. Galvao had said that he would cooperate with the Navy provided certain conditions were met. But because of the nature of these conditions, we could not provide Galvao with the necessary guarantees. Only Brazil could do that, and Brazil's attitude was as yet not determined.

Admiral Smith found a somewhat confused situation when he arrived in Brazil. Though Ambassador John Moore Cabot had been negotiating with a spokesman for the Brazilian Foreign Ministry about making the guarantees which Captain Galvao required, there had as yet been no results. The State Department said, "Since yesterday

noon we have been discussing with the Brazilian Government the overriding humanitarian considerations, namely the protection of passengers on board the ship, as contrasted with political considerations." Brazil had not agreed to anything.

There was talk now of bypassing both Belem and Recife and trying to take the *Santa Maria* into Fernando de Noronha, an island off the coast of Brazil where the United States maintained a guided missile tracking station. The island had adequate harbor facilities for receiving freighters and destroyers and it was thought that in a pinch it might be able to handle the *Santa Maria*.

But a more urgent problem confronted Admiral Smith. Brazil denied the Navy the use of the airfields at Belem and Recife from which to track the *Santa Maria*. Brazil was apparently annoyed because traffic in and out of Brazil had not been properly cleared with Brazilian officials. This meant that the Navy would no longer be able to maintain visual contact with the *Santa Maria*, although by means of regular radio "fixes" they still had a fairly accurate idea of her location. Further, it meant that Brazil was displeased because she had so far been ignored in the negotiations between Galvao and the United States, and was only being brought in at a fairly late stage. After all, the Brazilian official reasoned, neither Galvao nor the United States could do anything without her permission. This attitude created new problems in the days ahead, for by this time the Navy was willing to agree to any proposal of Galvao's that would take the passengers off the ship.

In these negotiations, Galvao was indicting a preference for transfer of the passengers at sea, but the Navy replied that this would be highly dangerous if not downright impossible. The Navy requested that Galvao proceed to Belem where Admiral Smith had set up temporary headquarters. Galvao said that he preferred to land at Recife.

But these were minor differences, and aside from refusing to attempt a transfer of the passengers at sea, the Navy realized that it was now pretty much in Galvao's hands for the moment.

On Monday conditions had improved. Brazil had again agreed to let the Navy use its bases at Belem and Recife. When the flights were resumed Commander Webster found the *Santa Maria* only 45 miles off Recife and radioed the ship: "Admiral Smith will board the destroyer *Gearing* at daylight tomorrow to proceed to rendezvous area. Disembarkation of passengers to take place tomorrow if possible."

Galvao was in an agreeable mood. He apologized for kidnapping the passengers but asserted: "All passengers have had their rights respected and to the present moment there has been no trouble between them and us."

He also permitted several of the passengers to speak to reporters on the plane and their voices were the first reliable indication that everything was all right aboard the *Santa Maria*.

Howard Weisenberger said: "Our morale is good, primarily because of frequent appearance of American naval aircraft."

Another passenger, Martin A. Yunker of Warren, Conn. confirmed that the passengers were treated "with respect and courtesy," but expressed concern that he and his fellow passengers would be caught in "a conflict" since they had heard that the Portuguese Navy was hunting for the *Santa Maria*.

That day there was more good news. Though the Kubitschek regime had now rejected a United States proposal that the *Santa Maria* be permitted to dock without being seized, incoming President Quadros told a reporter for the Rio paper, *Diario de Noticias*, that Captain Galvao was "an old friend" and that he would give him "all guarantees."

Further, Governor Lacerda of Guanabara State, a close associate of Quadros' told Galvao: "President Janio (Quadros) has declared to the press that he will assure disembarkation of passengers, political asylum for you and your companions, as well as to maintain you in command of the *Santa Maria*." Lacerda added that this was "not official but it was really the thought of the new President."

All this cheered Galvao and he radioed: "There is no

doubt that with the new government we will have the best reception and treatment on arriving at a Brazilian port."

But Quadros would not be inaugurated until the next day. Until something official was done, Galvao reiterated his plans to keep the *Santa Maria* at sea.

Later the same day, President Quadros had apparently changed his mind. When asked by other members of the press about the statement he had given to *Diario de Noticias*, he snapped: "When I have something to say about the *Santa Maria* I will not say it in this manner. I have nothing else to say right now."

And the *Diario de Noticias* reporter who got the original statement noted that President Quadros was given to saying things in an off-hand, ironical manner, and that this may have caused confusion.

Lisbon was now thoroughly alarmed at the treatment Galvao was receiving from the United States. If he were successful the regime saw further trouble ahead. Already a petition had been presented to the government protesting against the suppression of the newspaper *Republica* which was suspected of sympathizing with Galvao. The petition called attention to the "deplorable" condition of politics in Portugal which had produced an "emotional, perturbed and threatening atmosphere" which made discussion impossible.

The regime reacted strongly. An angry spokesman in Lisbon accused the United States of failing to live up to her obligations under the N.A.T.O. treaty to help Portugal recover the *Santa Maria* which was still Portuguese property.

"What about the Portuguese crew who are being forced to work at gunpoint?" the spokesman shouted. "The United States wants to assure the safety of its passengers and that is natural. But Portugal wants to assure the safety of its passengers, its ship and its crew, and now apparently the United States seems to be treating Galvao like some honored friend."

In support of Salazar's stand, a group speaking for the Portuguese merchant marine, delivered a message to the

U.S. Embassy asking that President Kennedy do something to protect the lives of the *Santa Maria's* crew to which the United States Navy appeared to be indifferent.

Aside from angry denunciations and protests the Portuguese fleet was at sea and it had been joined by the Spanish heavy cruiser *Canaris* (Spain is allied to and sympathetic toward the Salazar regime). These vessels hoped to prevent the *Santa Maria* from reaching any part of Portuguese territory once the passengers were discharged. Garrisons at the Cape Verde Islands in the mid-Atlantic as well as other Portuguese possessions had been reinforced. In Portugal itself the police were keeping a tight watch on everything in order to prevent any demonstrations of sympathy for Galvao or Delgado.

On Monday, January 30, Manuel Cardinal Goncalves Cerejeira, Patriarch of Lisbon, appealed to President Kennedy to guarantee "full liberty of disembarkation for those crew members of the Portuguese ship *Santa Maria* who desire to leave the ship." He added that it was the Church's duty to help the crew at a "grave moment" which might have "tragic and fatal consequences."

Back in Recife, the Brazilian coast was being scoured by a ragged fleet of fishing boats, tugs, and yachts, all hoping to be the first to sight the *Santa Maria* which was now hovering in the area. Reporters piled on anything that would float and chugged out to sea in a desperate gamble to be the first to find the *Santa Maria* and get exclusive interviews with Captain Galvao and the passengers. Since Saturday, foreign correspondents and photographers had felt the spray of salt and the wind in their teeth as they looked toward the horizon, hoping to catch a glimpse of the sleek Portuguese liner.

They created a carnival atmosphere in the sleepy city of Recife. One observer described it as the Recife Regatta for the *Santa Maria* Cup; it was one of the oddest races ever run at sea and nobody won.

The Navy kept its arrangements and rendezvous point with the *Santa Maria* secret and early on the morning of January 31, Admiral Smith and his aides, with a party of

over 100 newsmen, boarded the destroyer *Gearing* at Recife and headed for their rendezvous with Galvao.

Out in the Atlantic, Galvao radioed a final message before the meeting. "I hope," he said, "to enter Recife on the same solemn day that Brazil initiates a new era headed by your admirable and honored President Quadros."

As the *Gearing* kicked through the early morning mist, Admiral Smith must have breathed a long sigh of relief. It had been an aggravating week for the Navy. It had used four destroyers, two tankers, a nuclear submarine, 16 aircraft and over 1000 men in the search. What was more, it was not something the Navy could be very happy about, even now when it seemed that the mission was about to be successfully completed. Captain Galvao, however you looked at him, was not someone who had anything to do with the security of the United States, which it was the Navy's business to protect. At best and at worst, he was simply a pest to the Navy brass, and a pest who had let the Navy in for a great deal of criticism. Congressmen were crying for scalps because it had taken a week to pick out a dot in the immense expanse of the Atlantic Ocean.

All the trying negotiations, the realization that they could not drop everything else and hunt for Galvao (and yet many expected them to do just that), the worrisome business of International Law—Admiral Smith hoped it was all behind him now. If he could just get Galvao to do the reasonable thing it would all be over in a few hours.

The *Gearing* neared the rendezvous point and there on the horizon loomed the *Santa Maria*. Admiral Smith ordered flags run up the mast, indicating his presence and asking for a radio frequency on which the *Gearing* could contact the *Santa Maria*, while the destroyer circled the liner at a range of 1000 yards.

Then a Spanish voice crackled over the air. The first words from the *Santa Maria* were not promising: "We are obliged to consider the aspect of your destroyer unfriendly. Our conduct does not merit your arriving in combat disposition.

"As an old sea dog," the *Santa Maria* continued, "I recognize your dress."

Smith was alarmed. Although the Navy was prepared, if necessary, to follow the *Santa Maria* to Africa or until her fuel ran out, he certainly didn't want to.

Smith replied, "It is for your own protection. We are neither armed nor prepared for combat."

On board the *Gearing* they anxiously awaited the *Santa Maria's* reply. If she made a sudden run for it, they would be back where they were a week ago.

But Galvao may have been as weary of the chase as the Navy. He apologized, saying: "I beg your pardon. Thank you very much."

Then the *Santa Maria* signaled that they would lower a stairway to receive Smith and his party. Smith sounded the word to round up the boarding party; three other naval officers; an attache of the U.S. Embassy in Brazil; Commander Charles Rainey, Admiral Smith's public information officer; Commander Dias Fernandes of the Brazilian Navy; U.S. Consul in Recife, Earnest S. Guarderrama, and two official Navy photographers.

While they were being assembled the *Gearing* radioed the *Santa Maria* asking whether there would be any objections to bringing along the more than 100 correspondents of a dozen different nations who were aboard the *Gearing*. The *Santa Maria* replied that they were welcome to come aboard, but that they would be confined to a first class salon.

Then the *Santa Maria* asked if Portuguese national radio correspondent, Arthur Agostino, were coming aboard. Agostino, the *Santa Maria* said, would definitely not be welcome on the *Santa Maria* because in a broadcast from Rio he had called Galvao and his men "killers, murderers and thieves."

The *Gearing* said that Agostino was not on board, but the correspondents never did get their chance to board the *Santa Maria*.

Meanwhile there was activity in the sea which created some anxiety on board both the *Gearing* and the *Santa Maria*. First, one of the little tugs which had been chug-

ging up and down the coast, searching for the liner, hove into view and, blithely ignoring the momentous affairs which were in progress, pulled up alongside the *Santa Maria* and asked permission to unload some NBC cameramen and reporters she was carrying.

And then on the horizon another warship appeared. The Navy men peered through their binoculars. There had been reports that the Portuguese frigate *Pedro Escobar* was in the vicinity. If it were she, there was no telling what might happen.

The anxiety increased; the ship was about the size of the Portuguese vessel. Then she was identified; it was the *Damato*, another of the U.S. destroyers which had been in on the search since the beginning.

Now the weary Smith and his party stepped aboard a motor whaleboat which was lowered from the *Gearing* and popped across the 1000 yards of water between the two ships. The *Santa Maria* lowered a stairway and Admiral Smith, attired in his gleaming white full dress uniform with a full complement of gold braid, stepped aboard the Portuguese liner at 8:41 A.M. where he was greeted by Captain Galvao.

The passengers on deck cheered his arrival and he walked down the decks of the liner accompanied by an honor guard of rebels, dressed in yellow uniforms and wearing blue caps ringed in red and green (the national colors of Portugal).

While Smith and his party conferred aboard the *Santa Maria* with Captain Galvao the reporters and sailors on the *Gearing* were diverted by another interlude.

Around noon two single-engined planes suddenly appeared. They were civilian craft and appeared innocuous enough, but they kept circling the *Santa Maria*. The general opinion was that they were photographers who had flown out from Recife.

They were, but they were rather unusual photographers, for the doors of both planes opened and out into the blue jumped two people, apparently heading straight down the funnel of the *Santa Maria*. Then parachutes fluttered open and they both dropped into the water

about 1000 yards from the ship. One was picked up by the tug mentioned previously and the photographer, Jil Delamar, was taken on board the *Santa Maria*. Charles Bonnay of Paris Match, the other photographer, was not so lucky. Picked up by the *Gearing* he was confined under heavy guard until the destroyer returned to Recife.

A little later Smith emerged from his conference with Galvao and addressed the passengers over the ship's public address system.

He said: "I have just conducted a conference with Captain Galvao. He has given me strong reason to believe that he intends to discharge all passengers at Recife tomorrow.

"Within twenty-four hours I hope all of you will be disembarked. Do not, however, be too optimistic. It is entirely possible that Captain Galvao's plans will not materialize."

Back on the *Gearing*, Admiral Smith told reporters that his conference with Galvao on the *Santa Maria* (which Galvao had renamed the *Santa Libertad*—Saint Liberty) had been "in general, good."

When pressed about the "in general" Smith admitted, "The picture is not as definite as all concerned would like it to be." He added, "Our only interest is to get the passengers off safely."

When asked about the condition of the passengers after some 12 days at sea, Smith replied: "We talked with quite a few passengers aboard the *Santa Maria* and they were very nervous and apprehensive, living on hopes and promises."

What Smith had feared had happened. Galvao continued to make the demand that his ship would be permitted to leave Recife after disembarking his passengers. But the State Department had still been unable to get any responsible Brazilian official to agree to this demand. Although the *Santa Maria* had moved closer to Brazil, Galvao still had a long way to go before any passengers would get off the ship.

That night General Delgado flew from Rio to Recife, telling a throng of well-wishers at the airport that he con-

sidered it his "duty to take the greatest risk in the affair" even if this meant boarding the ship with Galvao and sailing for Portugal.

The next morning Galvao, comforted by President Quadros' remarks to the press and the assurances he had received from Governor Lacerdas, radioed Admiral Smith at 7:45 A.M. that he was coming into Recife. He pulled up anchor at 8:05 A.M. and the *Santa Maria* now accompanied by three American destroyers, the *Gearing*, *Vogelgesang*, and *Wilson*, broke out all her flags and made full steam for port.

The sailors on the destroyers saw the passengers on the deck of the liner, waving and cheering, overjoyed that their long ordeal was over at last.

But there was to be another delay. Arriving just outside the three-mile limit, the *Santa Maria* was met by the Brazilian destroyer, *Paraiba*, who warned Galvao that if he took his ship into Recife she would be seized. This was not the reception the rebel leader had expected. He halted his ship, and waited for some clarification of the situation.

A few minutes later Galvao received a message from President Quadros. This was the first official communication between the *Santa Maria* and Brazil's new chief executive and Galvao stood eagerly beside the radio operator while the message came over, hoping that President Quadros would tell him what he wanted to hear.

The message read (in part): "I reaffirm my loyalty to our unshakeable democratic convictions.

"You may be sure that in the exercise of my constitutional duties you and all who want to will receive the right of asylum in our territory and all else which laws and treaties permit.

"The government and the people of Brazil follow with profound emotion the fate of the passengers who are under your care and responsibility."

Again Brazil had avoided stating unequivocally that Galvao was free to sail into the harbor, discharge his passengers and sail away to fight another day. The message was friendly enough, but Galvao was not looking for senti-

ment. Without the guarantees which he had been seeking ever since the negotiations had started, Galvao refused to take the *Santa Maria* any further.

But his position had deteriorated. He was now surrounded by three American and one Brazilian destroyer whom he could not hope to escape. Reportedly food and water were in short supply on the ship. Some of the crew of the liner were definitely hostile to the rebels, the air conditioning had broken down, and the steerage class passengers were in a state of near mutiny.

Admiral Smith had no doubt that Galvao and the *Santa Maria* were now safely in the bag. "If the *Santa Maria* gets away from the *Sea Wolf* (the atomic submarine standing by)," he said, "that's something I want to see."

In Recife the city was in turmoil as pro- and anti-Salazar factions clashed in the streets in anticipation of the *Santa Maria's* imminent arrival. Brazil has many Portuguese nationals in addition to other first and second generation immigrants, and feelings run as high there as in Lisbon about Portuguese politics. They are expressed, if anything, more freely. Now mobs clubbed and stoned each other, trying to be the first to reach the docks and cheer or boo the incoming rebels.

Now Brazil took over negotiations with the *Santa Maria*, for from this point on, everything was in her hands. Twice, on the afternoon of February 1, the Brazilian corvette *Cabalo* pulled alongside the *Santa Maria* to permit Helio Citee, the port captain of Recife, and Colonel Jose Cavalcanti, Secretary of Public Affairs for the State of Pernambuco, to confer with Galvao. In the second conference these Brazilian emissaries were joined by Dario Castro Alves of the Foreign Ministry, who had just flown in from Rio bringing the government's latest instructions. As the corvette drew alongside the *Santa Maria*, the delegates were greeted by cries from hysterical women passengers: "For the love of God get us out of here!"

On the *Santa Maria*, Galvao made the expected demands: (1) that the ship remain in his possession after she entered Recife; (2) that the *Santa Maria* be supplied

with food, water and fuel; (3) that the rebels not be forced to leave the ship; and (4) that minor repairs to the *Santa Maria* be authorized. Again the Brazilians said that they were not empowered to make these guarantees.

Upon returning to the dock at Recife, the negotiators predicted that with or without his demands being met, Galvao would have to take his ship into harbor on the next day at the latest.

In both Brazilia, the new capital city of Brazil, and Washington, the Portuguese regime put on the utmost pressure to secure the return of her vessel and the safety of the passengers and crew. Ambassador Fernandes called on Secretary of State Dean Rusk to present him with a full bill of particulars. The Portuguese government was encouraged by President Kennedy's press conference of that day, when he referred to the *Santa Maria* in a statement which seemed to support the Portuguese position.

However, there was now little chance that Galvao and his men would be treated as pirates as the Salazar government insisted. President Quadros' message to Galvao seemed at least a tacit admission that a state of belligerency did exist and that under International Law, as Brazil interpreted it, Galvao and his men would be treated as rebels not pirates.

Late in the day, General Delgado arrived in Recife and raced by small boat to join Galvao and his embattled crew on the *Santa Maria*.

That night the negotiators returned to the *Santa Maria* with a definite proposal. But as they stepped aboard the liner, they were mobbed by crew members, demanding that something be done to take them off the ship. When Captain Galvao came forward to greet the Brazilians he was engulfed by the screaming crew who were at the point of open revolt. Galvao fought his way out of the mob, rallied his "rebels" and drove the crew from the deck with pistols and sub-machine guns.

Galvao then met the Brazilian officials in the first-class lounge and listened to their proposal. They said that under international law they were unable to give Galvao the guarantees he requested. What they were willing to

do, they said, was let the *Santa Maria* disembark her passengers in Recife harbor, then steam out past the three-mile limit again where negotiations between Brazil and Galvao would continue as to the final status of the *Santa Maria*. Galvao seemed impressed—it was the best offer he had had so far—but said that he would have to think it over. The Brazilians pleaded with him to accept, pointing out that the crew had been shouting that there was no water, no food; they asked him to think of the welfare of the passengers, who were not supporters of Salazar and who had done nothing to oppose Galvao's revolution. Galvao said he would sleep on it and give them his answer in the morning.

The next day the *Santa Maria* was surrounded at dawn by a motley array of fishing boats, tugs and private yachts, all bearing reporters, hoping to come on board for the first exclusive interviews. Galvao waved them all away.

"Get us off, get us off!" Mrs. Lucille Gray called to the floating press corps.

Lawrence Williams, a Canadian, said. "We are in peril of our lives every moment. Men with small arms, rifles and sub-machine guns are all over the place—they even eat with us."

Third-class passengers called that they were out of food and water.

But Doug Patton of Boulder City, Nevada, calmly informed a passing reporter, "We have everything we really need."

Then the startled reporters saw a near riot on deck. The crew had gathered in one portion of the ship and swept forward to demand that Galvao take the *Santa Maria* into the harbor. Steerage class passengers—penniless Spaniards returning home on tickets purchased by the Spanish government—who had been cooped up below decks without air-conditioning, joined them and together the whirling, screaming mob cornered Galvao outside the first-class salon. They kept pressing forward, there was a crash and someone catapulted head first through the heavy plate-glass window.

(One of the passengers thought it was Galvao himself,

but this is unlikely; pictures of him after the landing show him to be unscarred by recent experiences and a plate-glass window would certainly have left its mark.)

Galvao again rallied his men and tried to calm the excited passengers and crew, but this time there was no talking them out of their demands. Galvao gave a sigh and gave in; he knew that provisions were short, that the *Santa Maria* needed repairs, that he could never take her out of the harbor surrounded as he was by four swift destroyers.

Galvao gave the order, the *Santa Maria* hoisted anchor and steamed past the breakwater into Recife.

She came in proudly with all her flags flying; to the last, Galvao remained the ever gallant buccaneer. Even though he must have known that this was the end of his proud gesture, he didn't whimper or drag his tail.

The *Santa Maria* displayed a huge banner with the legend "Santa Liberdade" and another bearing the initials "D. R. I. L." which stood for the movement of liberation headed by Delgado. Galvao himself, his epaulets and braid glittering in the sun, stood on the bridge, his hands raised over his head in a gesture of unmistakable triumph, smiling and waving to the small craft that darted in and out between the *Santa Maria* and her four destroyer escort.

The docks of Recife were jammed with sightseers and partisans for and against Galvao. They pressed forward toward the water, but were held back from the docks by unyielding lines of police and Brazilian marines.

Even the roofs were crammed with men and women, clad for the pre-Lenten carnival which had already started in Recife, who had now turned out for the sight of real masqueraders.

The big ship pulled up alongside Dock #4 which had been assigned to the liner at noon. Galvao refused to take her up to the dock itself. For the next two hours the passengers sweated under the tropical sun while the ship's band played sambas and Portuguese and Brazilian patriotic tunes and tugs were collected in sufficient numbers to disembark the passengers.

The crew, still not sure whether Galvao would let them off the ship, grew steadily more boisterous. The passengers and crowds at the dock were diverted by several high dives from the deck of the ship by Portuguese crewmen who were then picked up by Brazilian navy tugs filled with swimming-suit clad marines.

Then the first tug pulled up alongside the *Santa Maria*, the stairway was lowered and the first passenger (an elderly Portuguese, sick with cancer, who had been returning to his homeland) came off the boat.

At this sight all the repressed emotions of twelve nerve-racking days at sea broke loose. Passengers shouted and cheered; women and even some men broke down and started to cry; long lines of jubilant Latins sang and danced on the second-class deck. Some were hysterical, some were calm and matter-of-fact but seemed glad to be leaving the *Santa Maria*.

The traditional order "Women and children first!" was given, but it may have been too much to expect these passengers to respond to such a command.

One American woman described the scene: "There was great confusion during disembarkation. At first it was announced that women and children would be taken off first. But the mob pressed forward. I tried to retire gracefully from combat but was pushed forward onto a stairway and that's why I was one of the first off."

Gradually order was restored and a steady line of passengers emerged. Swathed in fur coats, carrying all their luggage, burdened by cameras, parakeets and children's teddy bears, they got on the waiting tugs and left forever the scene of one of the most amazing sea voyages in recorded history.

When all the passengers were off, the crew started to clamber down the gangway, only to be forced back by Galvao's men at gun-point. Galvao knew that he could not sail his ship away without a crew, and he knew that they would not stay with him voluntarily. Once again the *Santa Maria's* deck was turned into a mob scene as Galvao's men pushed and were pushed by the frantic crew.

But the Brazilian officials remonstrated with Galvao.

After all, they said, they had offered him the chance of political asylum in their country; they could do no less for the crew; he would have to let them leave the ship.

"All right," Galvao replied, "perhaps it is over." He watched while the 350 crewmen clambered down the gangway and were replaced by Brazilian marines. Then a representative of the Portuguese company which owned the ship came forward with a Recife judge and handed him a writ for the repossession of the *Santa Maria*.

And as the passengers sped through the lush streets of tropical Recife, one reporter asked an American woman for her first thoughts on reaching land. They were simple: "Trees," she said, "I didn't think I'd ever see a tree again."

Chapter 6

THE AFTERMATH

CHAPTER SIX

THE AFTERMATH

AS the last of the crew filed slowly off the *Santa Maria*, Henrique Galvao must have known that his dreams of sailing on to Africa and starting a revolution that would eventually overthrow Salazar were over. He looked around and saw there were only 24 men left with him—his original band of devoted followers. (The Portuguese government and the *Santa Maria*'s captain continue to insist that Galvao had at least 60 men with him and that some came ashore with the passengers).

Galvao watched while a band of Brazilian marines came aboard to guard the ship and prevent him from taking the *Santa Maria* out to sea.

It was hardly necessary; Maior, Galvao's Spanish navigator, informed him that they needed at least 100 men to run the ship, and Galvao could not muster one-fourth that number.

Reporters flocked aboard and Galvao admitted that the game was up. "We are few," he said. "We cannot possibly continue our voyage. It would be foolish to sail this unarmed vessel out against the naval units now concen-

trated against us." (There were reports that the Portuguese frigate, *Pero Escobar*, was just outside the three-mile limit, waiting to blow the *Santa Maria* out of the water if Galvao attempted to sail her away.)

Galvao had been sorely disappointed in the crews reaction. He had counted on most of them joining him—only five out of 350 had expressed any sympathy for his aims, and even these had gone ashore with the others.

He told reporters that putting into Brazilian waters had undoubtedly been a tactical mistake, but that it had been prompted by "humanitarian reasons" i.e. he did not want to see the passengers hurt in the fight that would probably develop between the *Santa Maria* and armed Portuguese vessels if he tried to sail on to Africa.

Also, Galvao admitted, the ship had developed mechanical troubles, and she was low on food and water. He had thought that if he put in at Recife, he could discharge the passengers, patch up the ship, keep the crew aboard and go on with his revolution. But it had not worked out that way.

Galvao added that the struggle was not over; he and his men might have to accept political asylum but they would go on "fighting for liberty."

Galvao and his junta negotiated with the marine commander and it was agreed that both sides would put aside their arms until Galvao could negotiate a formal surrender of the ship to the Brazilian Navy.

The next day Admiral Dias Fernandes and Galvao sat down in an informal atmosphere and tried to work out a formula that would permit Galvao to surrender with "honor." There was another important consideration: if Galvao were to give the ship back directly to the Portuguese, he would not only lose face but there was a possibility that he and his men might be disturbed in their exile by a criminal indictment which the Colonial Navigation Company had instructed Captain Maia to file against Galvao, charging him with homicide, robbery, injuries, depriving passengers and crew of their liberty and damage to the liner.

Twice Galvao rejected Admiral Dias Fernandes' pro-

posals. Then, late in the afternoon, it was announced that they had reached an agreement and that Galvao would surrender the *Santa Maria* to the Brazilian government in return for a guarantee of political asylum.

At 6:22 P.M. Galvao, dressed in freshly pressed khakis, the black braid and gold stars shining from his shoulders, drew up his men in parade formation on the promenade deck of the *Santa Maria*. On the other side of the deck stood a long line of Brazilian marines at rigid attention. Stacked in the background were the arms with which Galvao had commandeered the great ship. Over one-hundred reporters and cameraman pressed forward to witness the last chapter in this stirring saga.

The rebels, the reporters noted, were not a very impressive body. They looked too few and too weak to have done what they had done. Some wore berets in imitation of their leader, while others favored red and green armbands. They ranged in age from an adolescent of 19 to a gray-haired, pot-bellied, veteran who said he had fought against Franco in 1936.

Galvao and Admiral Fernandes both made speeches. The Admiral stressed that Galvao and his men were not being held by the Brazilian government, but would be treated as political refugees. He said:

"Captain Galvao and his companions are Portuguese and other citizens and as such deserve our respect and cordiality.

"Their condition as men in rebellion makes them eligible for political asylum in Brazil.

"This is what we offer them, and we were all happy over the spirit of conciliation that prevailed today among us."

Then Galvao spoke. He expressed his regret that they could not go on, but said that it was impossible without a crew. But he pledged once again that the fight would go on.

Fernandes then turned to Galvao. "Do you agree to deliver this ship to Brazilian command?" he asked.

Galvao replied, "I do," and the two leaders embraced in the traditional Latin manner. It was all over.

Galvao and his men sadly hauled down the Portuguese flag and the banner of their movement, which had white, blue and yellow horizontal stripes with a yellow circle in the center.

Galvao went down the gangway to a waiting tugboat. As he came ashore, cameras whirred, the crowd cheered and he and Admiral Fernandes repeated their embrace. Then Galvao and his 23 rebels got on a bus which took them to police headquarters where they were all to spend the night. (The police stressed that they were not under arrest, but that with all the reporters in town it had been impossible to find any other accommodations.)

After Galvao and his men had left the docks, a tug went out and brought off the body of third officer Costa, the only casualty of this bizarre mutiny. One of Galvao's men admitted that he had been shot by one of the younger men who had "got panicky."

That night in town Galvao issued a new proclamation. He said that he had won; he said that he would fight against Salazar again and win even greater victories. The proclamation read:

"In the name of General Humberto Delgado and as commander of the *Santa Maria*, using the power His Excellency the General conferred upon me, I address to the people of Portugal the first revolutionary Proclamation of the Portuguese Liberation Junta.

"The *Santa Maria* was not captured as a romantic gesture and much less as a plan only to call the attention of the world to the Portuguese drama. The conquest of the grand and beautiful ship, which for eleven days cruised the Atlantic pursued by airplanes and ships of various nationalities, carries a significant lesson for us all.

"We would desire to prove, and we did prove, that the dictator Salazar is not invulnerable. We beat him and we ridiculed him and his navy before the entire free and Christian world. Tomorrow, when and wherever we return to face him, we will beat him once more.

"We would not be, however, that which we are, and we would not be your interlocutors if we were to stop on

the field of military actions. We are, in fact, at war with the Portuguese dictatorship in the same way that we are with Spanish dictatorship through out integration with the D.R.I.L. (Iberian Revolutionary Directorate of Liberation). But we are acting with a well-defined objective. It is not only the fall of Salazar that most interests us. We seek a revolutionary objective: the reconstruction of Portuguese society on new bases.

"Never, because of various circumstances, were the people of Portugal offered hope, a future, to the measure of their aspirations. Our propositions are, above all, to make this step decisive. We know that no one fights for vague promises and pretty words. To speak to the people of liberty, equality and fraternity advances nothing.

"We will not fall into the errors of the oppositionists who are afraid to irritate the dictator and take refuge in vague formulas. Our language is different: we prefer the concrete to the abstract. Our program is simple, most radical.

"We want a profound, authentic, human, total revolution. We will start with the destruction of an unjust social order and it will have as its bases agrarian reform and urban reform.

"Our propositions will be: land for those who work it and a house for those who live in it. We will liquidate large landed estates as we will liquidate stagnant speculation. We will destroy implacably privileges of the Portuguese plutocracy which from birth divides men into rich and poor.

"We are far from Lisbon and the dictator. But everything encourages us in the unshakeable certainty that we will enter Lisbon as victors to implant the Portuguese revolution of the twentieth century, a revolution that will open up also overseas the doors of liberty, progress and independence.

"These are the words that I have to say to you at the moment we are victoriously carrying out the first military action of the forces under my command, nucleus of the future army of liberty for Portugal and Spain."

Galvao added in answer to speculation which associated

him with Castro, "We have no affiliation with Castro, the Cuban prime minister, and no Cuban has joined us."

Carlos Junqueira, a Spanish member of the junta, told reporters: "Our companions in Europe and the Iberian Peninsula are continuing to fight."

The then incoming president, Quadros, turned the *Santa Maria* over to the Portuguese Government. Some of the rebels were disappointed. At their quarters, one of them told a reporter, "We are shocked and taken by surprise at the attitude of the Brazilian government, since it signed a document with us guaranteeing that the *Santa Maria* would stay under the Brazilian flag."

But there was little else Brazil could do. They could not very well keep the ship, and Galvao had given up all claim to it.

The Colonial Navigation Company found their ship in poor condition. The *Santa Maria*, during her 12 days of flight, had shipped a good deal of water and acquired a noticeable list; one of her power generators had broken down; the turbines were not working properly and her fuel had been used up. The Company thought they could have her seaworthy in a few hours but old hands doubted it.

The steamship company had also assumed full responsibility for getting passengers to their eventual destinations. The first of them flew out on a KLM jet the day after the *Santa Maria* docked. Arrangements were made to take others to Europe on the *Santa Maria's* sister ship, the *Vera Cruz*, which was also in Brazilian waters. American passengers were to be flown back to the States.

On Saturday, February 4, the rebels sat around the Recife police headquarters looking like men who had nothing to do and a long time to do it in. The police made it clear that they could go anywhere in Brazil, but few of them seemed to know where they wanted to go. After the excitement of the rebellion, they were a listless group, no longer united by the purpose and hope of the days at sea.

Galvao, himself, planned to fly back to Sao Paulo with Delgado and make further plans. The group would

stay together, he said. They would do great things in the future.

Under the terms of his agreement with Brazil, he and his men would have to give up their uniforms and return to civilian clothes. "The habit does not make the monk," commented Galvao, implying that the group would take up arms again.

A reporter asked him about the comment that he was only a visionary, not a practical politician. Galvao replied, "All revolutions are made by visionaries and not by the bourgeois!"

He boasted of his triumph. "Only twenty-four of us, twenty-four poorly armed men, took a ship with 1000 persons aboard."

He revealed that 18 of his men had boarded the *Santa Maria* at La Guara and 5 others at Curacao. The coup had cost \$6,000, most of it spent on tickets and guns.

Galvao says he will fight again, but the prospects for the future are not bright. The coup failed to spark any revolt in either Portugal or the colonies—something Galvao must have counted on.

It is true that there was an abortive attempt in Angola after the *Santa Maria* had been turned back to the Portuguese government, but it was ill-timed, insignificant and easily put down. Galvao had also succeeded in putting some heart into the opposition within Portugal—they presented several petitions, one to the president demanding that he "restore freedom" and dismiss Salazar—but Salazar was unlikely to be very worried by petitions.

But Galvao had been down before, and they had yet to count him out. In 1953, as he was about to be shut in a military prison for three years, playwright Galvao had shouted to his captors, "The last act of this drama has not been written." It could be that the fantastic incident of the *Santa Maria* is only the second act and that the grand finale in the life of this remarkable man is yet to come.

A COMPLETE LIST OF AMERICAN PASSENGERS ABOARD THE SANTA MARIA

- BATY, EBEN NEAL, sixty-four, Corte Madera, Calif.
- BATY, MRS. EMMA ISABEL JACKSON, sixty-six. Corte Madera, Calif.
- BOYCE, MRS. CAROLINE ELLE BOYCOTTE, sixty, Lutherville, Md.
- CHUBB, MRS. EDNA P., seventy-one, Pasadena, Calif.
- CROCKETT, DAVID R., seventy-one. Pompano Beach, Fla.
- CROCKETT, MRS. HELDEGARD, fifty, Pompano Beach, Fla.
- BATES, HENRY A., sixty-seven, Milburn, N. J.
- BATES, MRS. HENRY A., sixty-six, Milburn, N. J.
- DUNA, IRENE M., seventy-two, Claremont, Calif.
- DAWSON, JOHN W., sixty, Palo Alto, Calif.
- DAWSON, MRS. HEDWIG, sixty-two, Palo Alto, Calif.
- DIETZ, JOHN W., sixty-four, Gainesville, Fla.
- DIETZ, MRS. JOHN W., sixty-two, Gainesville, Fla.
- CHURCHILL, CHESTER ANDERSON, sixty-three, Lima, Ohio.
- CHURCHILL, MRS. CHESTER ANDERSON, sixty-one, Lima, Ohio.
- GREINER, CARL FREDERICK, seventy, Ormond Beach, Fla.
- GREINER, MRS. MARY LUCILLE, fifty-five, Ormond Beach, Fla.
- GRAY, MRS. LUCILLE, fifty-eight, Berwyn, Ill.
- STURMAN, MISS PAULINE, sixty, (Mrs. Gray's sister), Berwyn, Ill.
- THOMAS, MRS. DOROTHY, sixty, Los Angeles.
- HARBERSON, CECIL ROBERT, thirty-six, Lincoln, Neb.
- HARBERSON, MRS. JOAN DENSMORE, thirty-four, Lincoln, Neb.
- GORDON - WHITER, GORDON H., sixty-six, Weehawken, N. J.
- GORDON - WHITER, MRS. GORDON H., fifty-two, Weehawken, N. J.
- MILLER, LEON W., sixty-five, Springfield, Ill.
- MILLER, MRS. LEON W., sixty-eight, Springfield, Ill.
- WILLIAMSON, MRS. LUCILLE, eighty-two, Battle Creek, Mich.
- PATTON, ARTHUR DOUGLAS, sixty-one, Boulder City, Nev.
- PATTON, MRS. DOUGLAS, forty-eight, Boulder City, Neb.
- YUNKER, MARTIN, fifty-eight, Warren, Conn.
- YUNKER, MRS. MARTIN, sixty, Warren, Conn.
- SMITH, DELBERT CARL JR., thirty-nine, Johnstown, Pa.
- SMITH, MRS. SARA JANE HAMER, thirty-seven, Johnstown, Pa.
- SMITH, DEBORAH CAROLINE, seven, Johnstown, Pa.
- SMITH, NAT LOGAN, fifty-seven, Kailua, Oahu, Hawaii.
- PRESTON, PROF. AND MRS. FLOYD W., both thirty-seven of Lawrence, Kan., and children, CARL BRUCE, eleven; HAROLD WAYNE, nine; DONALD FLOYD, five, and STEVEN DEAN, two.
- WEISBERGER, HOWARD R., fifty-six, Las Vegas, Nev.

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
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
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