

NATIONAL OPERATIONS TEAM (EDUCATION) APPLICATION PACK 2018

WHAT IS THE NATIONAL OPERATIONS TEAM (EDUCATION)?

The National Operations Team (Education) is a group of volunteers who support others in the organisation in achieving their educational vision: national event committees, regional councils, regional event committees, and any other volunteer or group of volunteers in need of educational support. Overseen by the National Education Officer, at an operational level Ed Ops Team provides advice on content creation, feedback and final approval for all educational materials including briefing papers, resolutions and workshops. There will be a focus on greater collaborative work in the Ed Ops Team this year, which will see members working in pairs to not only review content, but also to provide feedback throughout the content writing process. The aim of this is to minimise the amount of content that ends up needing substantial reworking at the approvals stage, and also to offer better upskilling opportunities for the volunteers who are creating the content.

The Ed Ops Team is also an opportunity for all volunteers to engage with our educational content and processes – no matter what experience they may have. UN Youth facilitates awesome opportunities to learn more about the world we live in, and gain a heap of different skills while doing it. This learning isn't only for the students participating in our events, but also for the Volunteers who work hard to make our events happen.

ROLE SPECIFICS

- Membership as a Volunteer on the National Operations Team (Education) is for the 2018 calendar year.
- The National Operations Team (Education) will be divided into junior and senior members, so that members of the Team can work together to approve content, and learn from each other. Senior members will have more experience working with educational content, and along with the National Education Officer, will work to mentor/train junior members.
- Workload on the National Education Team will not be consistent or continuous, and so members are encouraged to apply for, and hold other roles in UN Youth.
- Some things we are looking for in applicants:
 - Strong research skills;
 - Some experience with educational content and writing is advantageous but not required;
 - An understanding as to the purpose of our content, and the level of quality we expect for our events;
 - A willingness to learn varying skills and processes e.g. working with Google Docs;
 - Dedication to the role;
 - The ability to work both independently and as a member of a team;
 - Time management skills.

APPLICATION

To apply, please fill out the application form online [here](#).

In your application please submit:

- Your CV (2 pages max)
- Personal statement: Please provide a brief personal statement as to your relevant experience and skills, and why you want to be on the National Operations Team (Education)? (300 words)
- Feedback (the briefing paper and resolution can be found following this page)
 - a. Please provide feedback/suggested edits on the following briefing paper. (300 words)
 - b. Please provide feedback/suggested edits on the following resolution. (300 words)

(Note your feedback can be in the form of annotations for both the briefing paper and resolution).

When providing feedback/suggesting edits to the briefing paper, you should be looking for things such as grammar, sentence structure (does the sentence make sense), basic factual accuracy and whether the briefing paper provides a well-rounded background to the topic.

When providing feedback/suggesting edits to the resolution, you should be looking for things such as grammar, structure and whether the clauses are conducive to good debate. Additionally, think about whether the clauses and the resolution as a whole are within the scope of the United Nations General Assembly, and whether anything could be added.

Applications close on the 4th February 2018 at 8pm. If you have questions or issues, please email the National Education Officer at education@unyouth.org.nz

BRIEFING PAPER – THE QUESTION OF MASS SURVEILLANCE AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The right to privacy has historically been deemed by the UN to be a fundamental civil, political and human right. However, the extent to which digital communications technologies are becoming a part of everyday life creates new challenges around maintaining these rights.

MASS SURVEILLANCE AND EDWARD SNOWDEN

In June 2010, the *Guardian* newspaper reported that the US National Security Agency (NSA) was collecting the telephone records of millions of Americans through one of the country's largest telecommunications agencies, Verizon, under an embargoed court order issued in April. This coverage was later followed by a report which alleged that the NSA was gathering information from the tapped servers of nine internet firms, amongst which were Facebook, Google and Microsoft, using a surveillance programme known as 'Prism,' the source of these leaks was later revealed to be former CIA employee and NSA contractor, Edward Snowden, now in Russia under asylum.

Snowden also identified Britain's GCSB as using Prism to gather information, and the issue deepened on 21st June when it was reported that they were also tapping into international cables of fibre-optic carrying global communications, and sharing large amounts of data with the NSA. Italy was alleged to be a prime example, having three undersea cables feeding into mainland communication. Snowden indeed identified the entire surveillance programme as having been underscored by multilateral information sharing within the 'Five Eyes' surveillance alliance of which the UK and the US are the main collaborators, but which also encompasses Canada, New Zealand and Australia and the leaked agreement, initially published by the *Guardian*, through a mess of contradictions and ambiguities revealed that this network was being used to circumvent domestic privacy laws and restrictions on surveillance. The alliance, however, continues in spite of these revelations.

Governments have also been found to have been placing pressure on private companies: particularly telecommunications corporates: to disclose bulk information on customers and employees for surveillance purposes; using formal legal mechanisms and the threat of economic sanctions as means of coercion.

POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS OF MASS DATA COLLECTION

There is no doubt that with mass surveillance techniques, governments wield a significant tool that could be utilised for negative purposes. One concern is the potential for mass surveillance to result in the restriction of fundamental human rights such as freedom of expression, freedom of association and freedom of the press. If governments have the capacity to monitor communications on a mass scale, it is not difficult to recognise an extension of this could be the identification of political opponents or dissenters. If this leads to the restriction of legitimate political opinion and expression, the line between valid security concerns and totalitarian control becomes increasingly blurred.

ARGUMENTS FOR MASS SURVEILLANCE AND INTELLIGENCE SHARING

There are of course, arguments for the use of mass-surveillance. These centre on the benefits which mass surveillance can be perceived to offer in the prevention and investigation of a wide

variety of crime such as terrorism and trafficking. Mass surveillance allows law enforcement agencies to openly monitor the communications data of an increasingly large number of people. By doing so they have the capacity to detect perpetrators of terror attacks or potential traffickers before the atrocity is carried out. Whereas conventional information gathering techniques such as search warrants or interviews require suspicion or evidence of prior naughty things, mass surveillance allows law enforcement agencies to gather information from those who have not previously come to their attention. In an every more technological world, people are being indoctrinated, planning and coordinating their activities and acquiring the tools of their crime online at a higher rate than before. This is especially the case when it comes to acts of terror – being able to track people’s accessing of radical websites and monitoring communications to flag potential indicators of radical tendencies undeniably has its benefits. The sharing of this information between governments seems logical in that it allows the intelligence gathered to be fully taken advantage of and the necessary steps taken. Despite the differing values and opinions it is clearly evident that it is no longer possible for conventional methods of crime detection and prevention to adequately address security issues. However, a balance must be struck between the competing values of security and privacy. Where this line is to be drawn is a highly contentious issue, with compelling arguments for both sides?

RESOLUTION – THE QUESTION OF MASS SURVEILLANCE AND THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY

The General Assembly,

Reaffirming its commitment to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), in particular Article 17 and its recognition of the right to privacy,

Expressing lots of profound concern at potential breaches of individuals' right to privacy by government surveillance,

Acknowledging the importance of surveillance and inter-governmental intelligence sharing in effective counter-terrorism and law enforcement,

Recognising the recent report by the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, and its conclusion that mass surveillance programmes constitute potentially disproportionate interference with the right to privacy,

1. *Calls upon* all States to respect and uphold the right of all individuals to privacy both offline and online;
2. *Emphasises* the importance of the principle of the rule of law and that, accordingly, States should ensure that the issuing of warrants to authorize surveillance is a function performed by ordinary courts and not arbitrary or quasi-judicial institutions;
3. *Calls for* the High Commissioner for Human Rights and Special Rapporteur on Privacy to investigate every claim of alleged government surveillance breaching an individual or group of individuals' right to privacy;
4. *Questions* the legality of mass surveillance techniques which as stated by the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms are likely to contravene the right to privacy due to their indiscriminate nature;
5. *Recommends* that States do not enter into intelligence sharing agreements with States which employ or which have employed questionable surveillance tactics such as 'advanced interrogation techniques' or mass and indiscriminate data gathering;
6. *Encourages* the Special Rapporteur on Privacy to formulate a set of 'Best Practice' guidelines for surveillance to ensure a reasonable balance is struck between the right to privacy and the need for security across the globe which should include how data is gathered, where it is stored and the extent to which surveillance can be carried out without a warrant;
7. *Orders* that States do not force private companies to disclose mass, indiscriminate private information pertaining to their customers, but rather limit any requests to specific individuals or groups;
8. *Resolves* to remain actively seized of the matter.